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INTRODUCTION :
 UK's relationship with the European Union has never been a bed of roses. In 1975, barely 
two years after joining, Harold Wilson’s Labour government consulted the British population by 
referendum asking them whether they wanted to remain in the European Community. At that 
time 67% answered “yes”. For the 42 years of membership, taking part in Europe has, for most 
British governments, comprised preventing Europe’s institutions from having too much power and 
negotiating exemptions and derogations to protect national sovereignty. In 2015 this has led to a 
UK that has managed to escape both from the single currency and the Schengen Agreements on 
the free movement of people. There are three areas in which the UK has made a strong contribution 
to the European Union without playing a wild-card: the creation of the internal market, enlargement 
and defence. The British have always felt comfortable with a European Union defined as a vast 
market, but much less so with one of political union. Since a market can never exist without 
regulation the governments in London have accepted however, whether they have liked it or not, for 
the European Union to regulate trade, financial services and capital. Hence enlargements have often 
been viewed as positive extensions to the market. Since UK, along with France, are the only ones 
to have an army that can project itself outside of the European Union, it has been able to make a 
significant contribution to European Defence without committing strongly to the institutionalisation 
of a European Defence Policy, which might have competed against NATO. 
 In 2015 British political life is marked by a wave of Euroscepticism which is not specific 
to the country. Most European States are experiencing this trend. Over the last few years an 
anti-European party, UKIP, has emerged in UK openly campaigning for the country’s exit from the 
European Union1. This prospect is shared by a significant number Conservative Party MPs in office 
at present. Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, for his part, is convinced that an exit from 
the European Union would not be a good choice for UK. Under pressure from the Eurosceptics in 
his party, he has however promised to hold a referendum on the issue before the end of 2017. 
The question put forward by the independent electoral commission at the House of Commons in 
September 2015 has the merit of being clear: “Should the UK remain a member of the European 
Union or leave the European Union?”. 
 David Cameron has to win this referendum by rallying British opinion to the status quo. 
To do this, he has to provide prior guarantees by re-negotiating the conditions of a status that 
is extremely particular to UK with the country’s partners in the European Union. Renegotiation 
is a complicated game, meaning that 27 capitals have to be won over. Although the Member 
States of the European Union are open to re-negotiation so that UK does not leave them, all have 
set red lines that cannot be crossed. In UK itself, Scotland, which is extremely attached to the 
European Union, is a constraint that David Cameron has to take on board: in the hands of the 
independentists, Edinburgh’s parliament will revive the issue of independence if the English (and 
no longer the British) decide to quit the EU. Caught between the Eurosceptics of UKIP and his own 
1.  The institutional reform of 
Lisbon (2009) introduced article 50 
into the Treaty on European Union 
which allows a Member State to 
exit the European Union.
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 2. Thanks to the support 
provided by the Centre d’Analyse, 
de Prévision et de Stratégie 
(CAPS) at the French Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs and International 
Development to the research 
group co-piloted by Thierry 
Chopin and Christian Lequesne 
within the CERI.
party, the Scottish independentists  and the other Member States, David Cameron has to play his 
cards subtly in undertaking renegotiation to see him win the inevitable referendum.
 In this paper a panel of European experts from the Centre for International Research 
(CERI) of Sciences Po and the Robert Schuman Foundation2 explores all of the issues at stake 
that will mark UK’s future in the European Union over the coming months: what does the British 
government want? What are its demands? Is the reform desired by London acceptable or not? How 
far are its partners willing to go to keep the UK in the EU? Is a compromise possible and acceptable 
to all of those involved? If so, what would the main shape of this be? The referendum result will 
depend, in part, on the negotiations that occur between London and its European partners and the 
answers provided to these questions.
 UK’s exit from the European Union would undoubtedly change the future of European 
integration by confirming true political disunion from a regional experiment that is unprecedented 
in the world.
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 1.THE DEBATE ABOUT ‘BREXIT’ IN THE UK
Pauline SCHNAPPER
 The UK is the only country to have ever 
contemplated leaving the European Union since it was 
created. In view of the numerous challenges the EU 
faces, its growing unpopularity among large swathes 
of its population and the consequences of a British 
withdrawal, the British referendum will be closely 
watched throughout the continent. Understanding the 
terms of this debate is key to assessing the prospect 
of Brexit, as it would have dramatic consequences on 
the process of European integration in general, raising 
the possibility of a disintegration of the EU (as well as 
of the UK, although that is a different matter).
 The return of a debate in the UK about 
whether to stay in the EU is in many ways puzzling. 
The issue, which dominated the political scene in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, had been apparently 
settled by 1975. In 1974 Harold Wilson, then leader 
of the Labour party in opposition, had rejected the 
terms of entry negotiated by Prime Minister Ted 
Heath before 1973 and promised, if he came back to 
power, to renegotiate these terms and then organise 
a referendum about whether to stay in the European 
Community. The ballot did take place in May 1975 
and a resounding “yes” vote of over 65% showed the 
clear wish of the British electorate to stay in. Even 
Margaret Thatcher, who became increasingly hostile 
to many aspects of European integration in the course 
of her premiership (1979-1990), never contemplated 
leaving the EC. As for Tony Blair (1997-2007), he 
championed a positive role for UK and the EU, talking 
about engagement and leadership.
The rise of euroscepticism
The reasons for questioning EU membership
 In order to understand why a withdrawal is 
now contemplated, we need to go back to one long-
term political evolution and one more immediate 
development in the UK and the EU. The long-term 
evolution is the rise of euroscepticism, especially 
within the Conservative Party and its off-shoot, the 
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). This 
started in the early 1990s at the time of the Maastricht 
treaty, which a minority of Conservative backbenchers 
considered as marking a turning-point towards a 
federal Europe which the UK could not accept, even 
though London had secured an opt-out from the single 
European currency and the Social Chapter. What was 
then a minority view in the party gradually gained 
ground in the late 1990s and during the 2000s, to the 
point where by 2010 it was almost impossible to be 
selected as a Conservative parliamentary candidate 
without holding strongly eurosceptic views. Meanwhile 
UKIP had been created (in 1993) with the specific aim 
of campaigning for withdrawal from the EU. It made 
increasingly significant gains in the following second-
order elections (held on proportional representation), 
especially in the European Parliament, where it came 
first in the May 2014 elections. In the May 2015 
general election it won only one seat in the House of 
Commons because of the first-past-the-post electoral 
system but attracted 12% of the popular votes, which 
was unprecedented.
 The second, more immediate reason why 
membership of the EU is again questioned has to do 
with the financial and economic crisis since 2008, 
which reinforced the British public’s scepticism 
towards the euro in particular and the European 
project as a whole. The fate of Greece in particular 
has fuelled opposition to the EU. There has been a 
widespread feeling, even among supposedly pro-
European politicians and journalists in the UK that the 
euro had been badly conceived and that Europe is in 
possible terminal economic decline. By 2012, as we 
will see below, polls showed that more British people 
were in favour of withdrawing from the EU than staying 
in. As for the Conservative party, it is now divided 
into different shades of euroscepticism, those who 
follow the Cameron line that the EU needs important 
reforms and the more radical ones, between 50 and 
100 backbenchers, for whom British withdrawal from 
the EU has become inevitable.
Arguments
 There are three main arguments used by 
supporters of withdrawal on the right: sovereignty, 
globalisation and immigration. The sovereignty of the 
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Parliament of Westminster has always been an issue 
for eurosceptics, who see it as incompatible with the 
authority of European over national law. Developments 
in the EU in the last two decades have increased, in 
their view, the unacceptable transfer of powers from 
London to Brussels, which needs to be reversed. 
Radical eurosceptics such as UKIP supporters and 
some Conservative MPs and MEPs have recently 
added a “globalist” argument which goes along the 
following line: UK has always prospered as a country 
open to the world, especially in terms of trade. By 
leaving the EU, it could sign new trade agreements 
with the US, Commonwealth countries and emerging 
economies, where the potential for growth is much 
higher than in sclerotic Europe. Similarly, immigration 
from Europe could be restricted and high-skilled 
immigration from Commonwealth countries, including 
India, encouraged. Finally, the surge in the number of 
migrants attempting to reach Europe in the summer of 
2015 is fuelling the anti-EU campaign, with Farage in 
particular arguing that it is impossible for UK to control 
its borders without leaving the EU. Alternatives to EU 
membership, though, have not been clearly spelled 
out by the no camp.
On the left, the anti-EU argument is slightly different, 
as it has more to do with the effects of widespread 
austerity, blamed on Germany, over the European 
economies and societies. The left of the Labour party 
opposes austerity both in the UK and in the EU, which 
is blamed for ignoring the plight of the populations 
affected by its policies. Jeremy Corbyn has repeatedly 
criticised the EU for not expanding voters’ rights and 
spreading neoliberal economic policies, although he 
eventually promised to support staying in the EU in an 
article for the Financial Times on 18 September.
 On the pro-EU side arguments, in so far as 
they are developed, are mostly about the economic 
benefits of belonging to a market of 500 million 
citizens. Supporters of EU membership quote the 
number of jobs directly or indirectly linked to the EU 
(5 or 6 million) and the share of British trade with EU 
Member States – about 50% of the total. Left-wingers 
add the benefit of EU social law, however limited, in 
ensuring paid holiday, maternity leave and a limit to 
the number of working hours. In both cases very little 
is said about solidarity between Member States.
The start of the campaign
 The organised debate about the EU has only 
started in view of the referendum, which will probably 
take place either in Spring or Autumn 2016. In theory, 
much will depend on what David Cameron manages 
to negotiate in Brussels and which concessions or opt-
outs he is able to extract from his European partners. 
But apart from a few members of Parliament who could 
indeed be swayed by the outcome of the negotiations, 
most politicians, medias, business and other influential 
actors have already made up their minds about whether 
staying in the EU or leaving it is the best solution for 
the UK.
The “anti” campaign
 The main actors are already setting up “pro” 
and “anti” EU organisations. On the anti-European 
side, several organisations are competing to take the 
lead in the campaign and become the official one – 
UKIP (TheKnow.eu now Leave.eu), Business for UK 
and Vote Leave. UKIP has launched its own campaign. 
Nigel Farage, its leader, has reneged on his promise 
to resign if he failed to be elected as an MP in the 
2015 general election in order to be able to play a full 
part in the campaign. UKIP has powerful and wealthy 
backers such as Richard Desmond, the owner of the 
Daily Express and Daily Star. However Farage is a 
controversial populist figure and anti-EU Conservative 
and Labour MPs do not wish to be seen campaigning 
alongside him. He has therefore let it be known that 
he would not wish to lead the campaign but would be 
happy to provide the bulk of activists on the ground.
Anti-EU company managers and CEOs have joined 
Business for UK, led by Mathew Elliott, who led the 
successful campaign against electoral reform in 2011. 
Their aim is to achieve “fundamental reform” of the 
EU including “powers flowing back to Member-States”. 
Their campaign is well-funded and has been very active 
in the media. One of their off-shoots, in the academic 
world, is Historians for UK, a group of about forty 
historians, some of them well-known in the medias 
like David Starkey, who argue for a renegotiation of 
the status of the UK in the EU, justifying UK’s semi-
detachment from Europe on historical grounds.1
1. See http://www.historytoday.
com/david-abulafia/britain-
apart-or-part-europe.
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Several dozen Conservative MPs are expected to 
campaign for Brexit unless Cameron negotiates a 
radical change for the UK in the EU, which looks very 
unlikely. More than 50 MPs have already joined a new 
organisation called Conservatives for UK, created in 
the summer of 2015 and headed by Steve Baker, and 
more MPs probably support it. Officially they agree with 
Cameron’s goal of renegotiating UK’s membership of the 
EU but acknowledge that they are “willing to consider 
how to prepare for an ‘out’ campaign if, lamentably, 
the European Union establishment will not allow the 
UK a new relationship of trade and co-operation”.2 A 
much smaller number of Labour MPs is expected to 
campaign for Brexit. About 15 of them have joined 
the new Labour for UK group, including Kate Hoey, 
Graham Stringer, Kelvin Hopkins, none of them leading 
figures of the party. But there is a rise in left-wing anti-
austerity euroscepticism in the party, epitomised by the 
unexpected new leader, Jeremy Corbyn. Having voted 
“no” in the 1975 referendum, he opposes any attempt 
to reduce UK’s involvement in European social policy. He 
first refused to rule out voting against membership, to 
the consternation of many in the party, before changing 
his stance. Some currently pro-European trade unions 
such as UNITE will also be looking at the outcome of 
the government’s negotiation before taking a stand.3 
Another one, RMT (transport) has already joined the no 
camp. Divisions within the party and trade unions on the 
merits of membership could lead to a weakening of the 
yes campaign.
 The other non-partisan organisation competing 
with Business for UK is still in its infancy in comparison. 
Chaired by Liz Bilney, TheKnow.eu (now Leave.eu) has 
attracted funding from Arron Banks, a UKIP donor, and 
other businessmen associated with eurosceptic groups. 
But its aspiration to lead the official campaign might be 
difficult to meet.
The “pro” campaign
 On the other side, the yes camp has strengths 
and weaknesses. In terms of organisation, British 
Influence, created in 2013 by former Cabinet ministers 
Kenneth Clarke (Conservative), Peter Mandelson 
(Labour) and Danny Alexander (Liberal Democrat) and 
chaired by Peter Wilding, has been active in traditional 
media and on the internet. It could become the core 
of the official pro-EU campaign. Funding for it comes, 
among others, from Lord Sainsbury, a former minister 
under Blair and owner of the retail chain. 
 Business for New Europe, set up in 2006 by 
Roland Rudd, is the opposite of Business for UK. It 
supports continued membership and has attracted 
former British diplomats. Its campaign director is Lucy 
Thomas, a former journalist. It has changed its name 
to The In Campaign and hired two strategists who 
worked on the successful 2015 Conservative campaign. 
All of those joined what should become the official 
In campaign, UK Stronger in Europe, launched on 12 
October 2015 by the former CEO of Marks & Spencer, 
Stuart Rose.
 All parties in opposition except UKIP officially 
support staying in the EU. Three of the four contenders 
for the leadership of Labour had unequivocally stated 
that they would campaign for a yes, as well as the vast 
majority of its MPs. Their experience of the Scottish 
referendum in 2014 has taught them that campaigning 
alongside other parties could be counter-productive so 
they are tempted to campaign alone. Labour Yes could 
be led by Alan Johnson, a respected former Cabinet 
minister under Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The new 
leader, Jeremy Corbyn, himself an old soft eurosceptic, 
will have to tread carefully to avoid damaging splits 
within the party during the campaign. The Liberal 
Democrats are staunch pro-Europeans – but they 
have been reduced to only 8 MPs in the 2015 general 
election. A majority of Conservative MPs should support 
Cameron unless he fails to win any concessions from 
his EU partners. Finally, the Scottish nationalists (SNP) 
are strongly in favour of EU membership, to the point of 
demanding a separate counting of the votes in Scotland 
and England in the referendum and refusing to be taken 
out of the EU against their will. But they should campaign 
mostly in Scotland, which will limit their influence on the 
debate.
 The position of the medias is still unclear, 
except for the Express group. Rupert Murdoch, the 
powerful owner of The Times, The Sun and Sky TV, is 
a well-known radical Eurosceptic but seems to have 
concluded that his business interests would be better 
served if the UK stayed in the EU. Other traditional 
media have yet to take a stance, although most of them 
2.Steve Baker MP, 
« Conservatives will stand up for 
Britain if the EU lets us down », 
The Daily Telegraph, 6 June 
2015.
3.« Britain’s biggest union Unite 
weighs up campaigning for 
Brexit », Financial Times, 16 
July 2015.
07
 FONDATION ROBERT SCHUMAN / 20th OCTOBER 2015
Brexit: What Fair Deal between UK and EU Member States ?
will probably support the status quo. Whether these 
matter and influence voters is another issue. Not only 
have the internet, political blogs and social media totally 
thrown classical journalism up in the air, but the level of 
trust towards the media in general in the UK is low, at 
about 40%.4
 A majority of business organisations tend 
towards staying in. The Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI), which represents large companies, 
TheCityUK, which is the voice of the financial sector, 
and the Institute of Directors, which represents mostly 
small and medium size companies are very critical of 
European bureaucracy and red tape but have adopted 
the Cameron line of renegotiating and staying in. Other 
smaller pro-EU organisations and pressure groups have 
been set up already, and more will probably follow, 
such as Universities for Europe, launched in July 2015 
by UniversitiesUK, which represents over 100 higher 
education institutions.
The referendum
 The referendum campaign is only starting and 
the Electoral Commission still has to appoint the two 
official lead campaigns which will be publicly funded 
and have access to public broadcasts. The Commission 
has already recommended a change in the wording of 
the question which was in the EU (Referendum) Bill 
introduced in Parliament in June 2015. Instead of: 
“Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union?” which the government wanted, it will 
be the supposedly more balanced “Should UK remain a 
member of the EU or should the UK leave the EU?” In 
the former option, voting yes would have been voting for 
the status quo, which won in the last two referendums 
in the UK – the referendum on Alternative Vote in 2011 
and the referendum on Scottish independence in 2014. 
Instead voters will choose between “in” and “out”.
 Other issues which need to be settled include 
whether government ministers and departments would 
be allowed to give their views and use public funding 
in the run up to the ballot. Cameron had planned to lift 
the traditional so-called purdah rule that this cannot be 
the case but the move was strongly resisted by anti-
European Conservative MPs and the Premier Minister 
lost its first vote in the Commons on the issue on 6 
September 2015. Whether ministers will be allowed 
to campaign against the Prime Minister, therefore be 
relieved of the principle of collective responsibility at the 
heart of Cabinet government, remains to be seen.
Opinion polls have shown U-turns in attitudes towards 
EU membership since 2012. Whereas a majority of 
respondents had come to support withdrawing from the 
EU before Cameron’s Bloomberg speech (51% against 
28% in the summer of 2012), the trend then reversed. 
The two lines crossed in early 2014, with a majority in 
favour of staying in the EU appearing then and remaining 
since. Available data from YouGov, in May 2015, gave 
45% of respondents supporting membership against 
33%. But at the time of writing, a survation poll for the 
Daily Mail on 5 September showed a small majority of 
51% in favour of withdrawal. These shifts in figures show 
that opinion on Europe is extremely volatile, susceptible 
to further swings until the referendum day. We know 
that polls are not entirely reliable either, as the general 
election results showed in May 2015. Furthermore, 
experience shows that voters do not always or only give 
their say on the question asked but more generally on the 
incumbent government in this kind of election. Rejection 
of the establishment, deemed pro-European, which is 
obvious in the large support for UKIP and even in the 
election of Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader, could also 
affect voting. All of this suggests a greater uncertainty 
about the outcome than these figures imply. In this 
context, the ground and air campaigns will matter.
***
 The EU referendum campaign is not fully 
running yet with no date set for the ballot, but it is 
already clear that the main parties, and not just the 
Conservative party, will be divided on the issue and 
that both the “pro” and “anti” EU camps will also be 
divided with different parties and individuals refusing 
to campaign together. This might not contribute to the 
most informed and clear debate about the pros and 
cons of EU membership. Other domestic factors such 
as the popularity of the government and of the different 
parties, voters’ dissatisfaction and disenchantment with 
the political system as a whole will play a large part 
in the referendum outcome, which therefore remains 
open. 
4. See https://yougov.co.uk/
news/2011/11/14/trust-media/.
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2. CRUCIAL YET POINTLESS: RENEGOTIATING THE 
TERMS OF  UK’S EU MEMBERSHIP
 In his 2013 Bloomberg speech, David 
Cameron promised that, in the event that he won 
the 2015 election, he would begin ‘renegotiations 
for fundamental change’ of the terms and conditions 
of British EU membership. On the basis of the ‘new 
settlement’, he promised from these negotiations that 
the British would vote whether to stay in or leave the 
EU. Consequently, the Government has embarked on 
this renegotiation. The Prime Minister and Chancellor 
have visited numerous European capitals over the 
summer, laying out their vision for a new British 
‘settlement’. 
 It is too early either to say for certain  either 
how successful the renegotiation will prove to be or 
even, for that matter, what precisely the Prime Minister 
will ask from his partners, for reasons explored 
below. There are, however, certainly clues that can be 
discerned, both from the early stage of the negotiations 
and from the statements made by British political 
leaders since 2013. 
 Based on what we know, the conclusion we 
come to is that David Cameron will secure relatively 
little from his much vaunted renegotiation, and 
certainly not the ‘fundamental change’ of UK’s terms 
and conditions of EU membership that he promised. 
Partly, this will be a function of the relatively limited 
nature of what he is likely to ask for. Partly, too, it will 
be the result of his partners being unwilling or unable 
to give him everything he wants. 
 Nevertheless, the renegotiations will play a 
crucial role for the Prime Minister. Broadly speaking, 
he has two objectives: on the one hand to win the 
referendum and keep UK in the EU. On the other, David 
Cameron is anxious to preserve both his party and 
his government’s majority in the House of Commons. 
The fundamental problem that he now faces is that 
of coming up with a reform agenda that would be 
acceptable to UK’s partners, while convincing sufficient 
numbers of his backbenchers to back it. 
What the government Wants
 There is still much confusion concerning the 
nature of the British renegotiation agenda. However, 
from various speeches and statements made by British 
and their officials, it is possible to identify the five 
main ‘baskets’ of issues that will probably figure in 
discussions with EU partners. 
 The first comprises issues related to 
competitiveness, growth and the single market. The 
government has expressed its desire to see the EU 
cut the red tape that, it claims, weighs too heavily, 
particularly on small businesses. At the same time, 
Ministers have stressed the need to complete the single 
market, particularly in areas such as services, and the 
digital economy. Finally, Cameron has spoken of the 
need to set ambitious targets for the completion of 
free trade agreements with key partners, including the 
United States, Japan and India. 
 Secondly, the government has spoken 
repeatedly of the need to provide national parliaments 
with a greater role in EU decision making. Under the so-
called ‘yellow card’ procedure introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, a third or more of national parliaments could 
temporarily block draft EU legislation. There has been 
much debate in UK of supplementing this by potentially 
introducing ‘red’ and ‘green’ card systems under which, 
respectively, groups of national parliaments could veto 
or propose EU law.  
 The third ‘basket’ of measures relate to the 
UK’s place as a largely satisfied, "statu quo" member 
of the EU opposed to further integration. In the first 
place, the UK government has repeatedly stressed 
its determination to secure an opt out from the 
commitment in the EU treaty to ‘ever closer union’.
 Fourthly, the Prime Minister is anxious to 
secure a deal to ensure that euro area members respect 
the interests of non-euro members even if the former 
group proceeded with further integration to safeguard 
the single currency. The fears that underlie this demand 
were summarised by Lord Lawson: “Not only do our 
interests increasingly differ from those of the euro area 
members but, while never ‘at the heart of Europe’ … 
we are now becoming increasingly marginalised as we 
are doomed to being consistently outvoted by the euro 
area bloc”.1  
Louise BORJES and Anand MENON
1. Nigel Lawson, “I’ll be Voting 
to Quit the EU”, The Times, 7 
May 2013,http://www.thetimes.
co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/
article3757562.ece.
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 Two respected Financial Times journalists 
have in fact claimed that the George Osborne’s 
search for guarantees for euro-outs — specifically, his 
determination to protect the City of London  against 
discrimination by the countries of the single currency — 
has become his ‘central mission’ in the renegotiation.2 
Finally, the government has stressed its desire to address 
what is seen as the ‘problem’ of intra-EU migration and 
particularly of the rights of EU migrants to claim social 
security benefits in the UK. The Prime Minister did 
not in fact mention either migrants or benefits in his 
Bloomberg speech. Subsequently, however, pressure 
from Conservative back benchers and the increasing 
political salience of immigration in the UK have led the 
government to revise their demands in this area. 
 In an article in The Daily Telegraph in March 
2014, Cameron referred to the need to build the EU 
around ‘the right to work not the right to claim,’ whilst 
stressing the need to prevent ‘vast migrations’ when 
new countries join the EU.3 By the time of his major 
immigration speech in November of that year, however, 
the Prime Minister had significantly ratcheted up his 
demands, specifically in terms of the ability of EU 
migrants to claim benefits within UK.4 He argued for 
restrictions on the right of unemployed migrants to 
claim benefits such as the job seekers allowance, whilst 
also, crucially, stating his desire to limit the ability of 
those EU migrants in work to benefit from benefits such 
as working tax credit. The suggested four year waiting 
period before EU migrants can claim those benefits 
was laid out in the Conservative’s general election 
manifesto,5 increasing the pressure on Cameron to 
secure this.
What could the UK secure?
 It is interesting to note that, of the six ‘specific 
changes’ he wanted to see in the EU (his seventh 
concerned the ECHR) the Prime Minister outlined in the 
March 2014 Daily Telegraph article, significant progress 
has been made. A European Court of Justice Ruling 
in November 2014 reaffirmed the right of Member 
States not to pay benefits to EU migrants who were 
not seeking work, effectively addressing Cameron’s 
concerns on this score. National parliaments, 
acting in concert, already enjoy the right to block 
European Commission legislative proposals, while the 
Commission’s Vice President Frans Timmermans has 
promised to work more closely with these parliaments 
than his predecessors.
 As for Cameron’s desire to free business from 
red tape and end ‘excessive interference’ from Brussels, 
EU legislative output has slowed dramatically since the 
Treaty of Lisbon. The Commission’s REFIT (Regulatory 
fitness and Performance) programme has led to the 
withdrawal of almost 300 legislative proposals to date 
and begun to instil a new, deregulatory ethos within 
that institution.   And Commissioner Timmermans has 
himself argued that the EU needs a ‘culture change’ 
in the way it regulates. Specifically, unnecessary 
regulation should be scrapped, giving business 
‘immediate relief.’ 
 Moreover, a recent report by the European 
Council on Foreign Relations underlined that there 
exists significant support amongst other Member 
States for the objectives both of completing the single 
market, and rapidly concluding trade deals with key 
partners.6 Obviously, this is no guarantee of successful 
outcomes, but the Prime Minister can credibly claim to 
have strong EU support for his objectives. 
 As for the Prime Minister’s concern pertaining 
to the EU treaty commitment to pursue an ‘ever closer 
union,’ while the offending phrase remains in place it is 
worth noting that the text goes on to recognise the need 
to respect ‘the diversity of the culture and traditions 
of the peoples of Europe as well as the national 
identities of the Member States and the organisation 
of their public authorities at national, regional and 
local levels.’ In a further concession, the conclusions 
of the European Council meeting of 26-27 June 2014 
noted that the: ‘UK raised some concerns related to the 
future development of the EU. These concerns will need 
to be addressed. In this context, the European Council 
noted that the concept of ever closer union allows for 
different paths of integration for different countries, 
allowing those that want to deepen integration to move 
ahead, while respecting the wish of those who do not 
want to deepen any further’.7 
 In terms of being able to secure further 
concessions on this score, however, prospects are 
relatively limited. The simple reason is that treaty 
change is simply not feasible within the timeframe 
2. Alex Barker and George 
Parker, ‘George Osborne 
makes Shielding City Priority 
in EU Talks,’ Financial Times, 9 
September 2015.  
3. Tim Ross, “David Cameron: 
my seven targets for a new EU”, 
The Daily Telegraph, 15 March 
2014, http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/newstopics/
eureferendum/10700610/David-
Cameron-my-seven-targets-for-
a-new-EU.html. 
4. http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/
coffeehouse/2014/11/david-
camerons-immigration-speech-
full-text/ 
5. The Conservative Party 
Manifesto, https://s3-
eu-west-1.amazonaws.
com/manifesto2015/
ConservativeManifesto2015.pdf, 
2015, p.30.
6. ECFR, ‘Britain in the EU 
Renegotiation Scorecard,’ 
London, ECFR, September 2015
7. http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/
docs/pressdata/en/ec/143478.
pdf, p.11.
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set by the Prime Minister, not least because so many 
Member States are opposed to undertaking such a 
process. Consequently, the best he could hope for 
would be some kind of declaration stating the intention 
of other Member States to amend the treaties at some 
later date to limit the applicability of the ever closer 
union clause to the UK. Given that no EU government 
can bind its successor or – still less – its electorate, such 
a deal would hardly represent a cast iron commitment.8
A similar dilemma confronts the British government 
when it comes to seeking safeguards for non-euro 
countries, and avoiding discrimination against them. 
Here again the obvious solution would be treaty change 
and here again this is simply not possible. When it 
comes to ensuring consultation with non-euro area 
member, this could presumably be achieved via simple 
agreement on such norms in the Council. Certainly, 
this would help avoid situations such as that in July 
2015 when euro area members discussed using the 
European Financial Stability Mechanism to provide 
loans for Greece with non-euro members absent from 
the room.
 However, when it comes to protecting non 
euro members from the effects of caucusing within 
the euro area, (and the consequent potential of being 
outvoted on issues related to the single market), the 
situation is far less reassuring. For one thing, some 
Member States are inherently suspicious of what they 
see as attempts by the UK simply to acquire a veto over 
legislation affecting the City of London. For another, not 
all the non-euro members are united behind Cameron’s 
demands, making it harder to achieve a desirable 
outcome. 
 Finally, on migration, many of the demands 
hinted at by the government have effectively already 
been addressed. A recent ruling by the European Court 
of Justice reaffirmed the rights of Member States to 
limit the right of migrants to out of work benefits. 
With no enlargement on the agenda, there will be no 
new wave of migrants from accession states. The real 
problem Mr Cameron faces, however, lies in trying to 
impose limits on the ability of those in work to claim 
benefits such as tax credits. To do this would directly 
contradict the principle of free movement of labour, 
in that it would discriminate between UK and other 
EU nationals. Key Member States – notably Germany 
and many of the Central and East European states 
have made it clear they would simply not tolerate any 
dilution of this principle. 
Politics at Home
 Whilst the Prime Minister might accomplish 
some of his objectives, it is hard to see him managing 
to secure all of them, including the most totemic in 
terms of public opinion at home – curbs on the number 
of EU migrants. Whatever he does achieve seems 
certain to fall short of the ‘fundamental change’ in UK’s 
relationship with the EU that he promised. 
 For all of this, however, the renegotiation 
remains politically indispensable. A significant number 
of Conservative backbenchers have indicated that 
they will make up their minds on how to vote in the 
referendum once they have seen the fruits of the Prime 
Minister’s efforts. Boris Johnson has stated that, he 
will vote to leave the EU unless ‘we get the reforms 
we need’.9 The Eurosceptic business-backed campaign 
Business for UK recently published the report ‘Change, 
or go’, demanding either fundamental reform, or a 
British exit.10 
 In a telling indication of how divided the 
parliamentary Conservative party is over Europe, the 
Financial Times (1 September 2015) reported that the 
No campaign have approached eight cabinet ministers 
to enquire about them joining the campaign to secure 
a British exit. Those least convinced of the case for 
membership in the Cabinet are thought to be Iain 
Duncan Smith, Work and Pensions secretary and Chris 
Grayling, leader of House of Commons. Michael Gove, 
Elizabeth Truss and Philip Hammond, for their parts, 
have all expressed more or less marked Eurosceptic 
opinions.
 It remains crucial for the Prime Minister – and 
perhaps even more for the Chancellor George Osborne, 
who is playing a prominent role in the negotiations 
and hopes to inherit leadership of the Party from 
David Cameron – that he achieves enough through the 
renegotiation  to convince as many sceptics as possible 
to support continued British membership. David 
Cameron’s problem in domestic politics has shifted 
from being one of attempting to win an election against 
a projected UKIP threat, to managing a government 
8. John Kerr, ‘Britain’s 
renegotiation: Advice to Mr 
Cameron,’ London, CER, July 
2015
9. M. Holehouse and S. Swinford, 
‘George Osborne tells EU: 
Do not underestimate our 
determination’, The Telegraph, 
13 May 2015, http://www.
telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/
eureferendum/11600910/
George-Osborne-tells-EU-Do-not-
underestimate-our-determination.
html (accessed 12 August 2015).
10. Business for Britain, Change, 
or go – How Britain would gain 
influence and prosper outside 
an unreformed EU, Business for 
Britain, London, 2015, http://
forbritain.org/cogwholebook.pdf 
(accessed 9 August 2015).
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with a meagre majority of 12 in a context where the 
governing party will probably hold an election to select 
a new leader in the autumn of 2018 (therefore likely to 
take place within two years of the referendum on EU 
membership). 
 As much as anything else, this looks likely to 
impact on the style of the renegotiation. Here again, 
however, the Prime Minister confronts a dilemma. 
On the one hand, many observers have stressed the 
need for the UK to engage positively and make it clear 
that what it is putting forward is not a wish list for 
the UK, but a series of proposals aimed at making the 
EU itself more effective and successful. In other words, 
rather than arguing in favour of less Europe for the 
UK, the government should be seen to be promoting 
a better Europe for everyone.11 And indeed, George 
Osborne, on the eve of a visit to Helsinki, Stockholm 
and Copenhagen in August 2015 argued that the UK 
wanted a ‘new settlement for Europe that works for 
everyone within it.’12 
 On the other hand, the logic of domestic 
politics might militate in favour of a more conflictual 
approach. For one thing, it is important that the Prime 
Minister persuade sceptics that he has achieved as 
much as could be wrought out of his partners. Moreover, 
the evidence suggests that the British people like the 
sight of their Prime Minister winning arguments with 
his European partners. Both Cameron’s refusal to sign 
the fiscal compact and his Bloomberg speech led to 
spikes in support for EU membership in public opinion. 
Conveying the opinion of having fought – and of course 
won – a battle in ‘Europe’ could then help the Prime 
Minister when it comes to reconciling the need to win 
the referendum with that of keeping his party together. 
The other conundrum that Cameron faces is that 
reconciling Tory backbenchers requires the kind of 
agenda that might disillusion ‘soft’ supporters of 
European integration on the left. The key issue in this 
respect is EU social and employment policy. As leader 
of the opposition in 2007, Cameron himself vowed to 
pull the UK out of the social chapter if he ever became 
Prime Minister. Recently, however, it has been reported 
(Financial Times, 31 August 2015) that he had decided 
not to demand full exclusion form EU employment 
laws, not least because of expected strong opposition 
from the European Parliament13. 
 This has enraged some of his own supporters. 
Boris Johnson is amongst those who have expressed a 
desire to see the government roll back EU social and 
employment legislation. Bernard Jenkins has declared 
that he wants a treaty change to repatriate employment 
powers before any vote on EU membership. On the other 
hand, however, the newly elected Labour Party leader 
Jeremy Corbyn hinted during his leadership election 
campaign, together with several Trade Union leaders 
who have already signalled that they might support 
a British exit should the Prime Minister negotiate 
exceptions for UK from EU social and employment 
regulations. Corbyn stated, in a televised leadership 
debate on Sky TV that he was ‘concerned about the 
way the European Union is increasingly operating like a 
free market across Europe tearing up the social chapter 
and damaging workers’ interests.’ Never slow to pick up 
on an opportunity, Nigel Farage made an explicit appeal 
to the left to join a broad pro-Brexit alliance when 
launching the UKIP campaign for the referendum.14 
 Additionally, pollsters seem to agree that a lack 
of support from the left for continued EU membership 
could prove fatal for those hoping UK will remain within 
the EU. The Prime Minister, therefore, has a difficult 
balancing act to perform, securing enough to keep his 
party together and his slim majority in parliament safe 
(the euroscpetics have already inflicted parliamentary 
defeats on him over procedural issues such as purdah) 
whilst not alienating the centre left.
***
 The Prime Minister thus finds himself 
caught between the conflicting – and in some ways 
incompatible – demands the EU, the Conservative 
Party and the centre left have expressed. In perhaps 
the most eloquent testimony to his dilemma, the 
renegotiation still has, as one analysis has put it, a 
‘shadowy, ethereal feel.’ Anxious to avoid the necessary 
hard choices involved in attempting to placate these 
different interests, the Prime Minister has hesitated to 
publish a clear statement of his renegotiation aims and 
objectives.15 
The nascent referendum campaign, consequently, 
has the feel of a phoney war. The promise of a new 
settlement with the Union has been held out to prevent 
11. ECFR, ‘Britain in the EU 
Renegotiation Scorecard,’ 
London, ECFR, September 
2015, p. 4
12. BBC News, ‘EU referendum: 
UK settlement will benefit other 
nations – Osborne’, 24 August 
2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/uk-politics-34036593. 
13. George Parker and Jim 
Pickard, ‘Cameron waters down 
employment demands ahead 
of EU poll’, Financial Times, 
31 August 2015, http://www.
ft.com/cms/s/0/d146c4bc-
4fc6-11e5-8642-453585f2cfcd.
html#axzz3m0RkVEQC.
14. Jim Pickard, ‘Farage woos 
the IUK left for No vote in 
Europe referendum,’ Financial 
Times 4 September 2015.
15. ECFR, ‘Britain in the EU 
Renegotiation Scorecard,’ 
London, ECFR, September 
2015, p. 2
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even many of those inclined to want the UK to leave 
the EU to hold their fire until the Prime Minister secures 
what he can. Equally, the Government has reportedly 
put pressure on business leaders not to express public 
support for continued membership until the outcome of 
the renegotiation is known, presumably to encourage 
those who would support membership whether 
renegotiated or not to speak out in favour of whatever 
deal he eventually secures.16 
 There is thus an unmistakable chicken and egg 
quality about the renegotiation debate. The UK’s EU 
partners are understandably reluctant to strike a deal 
until the Prime Minister himself shows himself willing to 
fight for membership. He in turn is reluctant to commit 
himself until he has a deal he feels will reconcile his 
domestic audiences. Certainly, it is hard to see a way in 
which the Prime Minister could secure concessions from 
his partners that would satisfy the more Eurosceptic 
elements within his party. Nonetheless, his objective 
of preserving as much party unity as he can is all too 
understandable. Amidst all this uncertainty, the one 
thing we can be certain of is that the renegotiation 
process will continue to be highly unpredictable.
16. Sarah Gordon, George Parker 
and Jim Ickard, ‘UK business told 
to “shut up” over Brexit poll,’ 
Financial Times, 6 September 
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3. SCOTLAND AND THE UK-EU REFERENDUM
 With the return of a majority Conservative 
Government in the May 2015 general election it became 
inevitable that a referendum would be held before the 
end of 2017 to determine whether the UK will remain 
a member of the EU. Leading up to that referendum 
the UK Government will conclude negotiations with 
the other 27 Member States seeking to revise the 
UK’s terms of EU membership. Thus far the detail 
of the reforms the UK is pursuing remains unclear. 
If, however, the reforms require a revision to the EU 
Treaties it is highly unlikely the necessary ratification 
process could be completed by the latest date on which 
the referendum would be held. In such circumstances 
the UK Government will seek a commitment from other 
Member States that the agreed Treaty changes – most 
probably set out in a new Protocol – will be ratified 
and implemented subsequently. Problematically, of 
course, it falls to national parliaments to ratify EU 
Treaty changes, and no government can guarantee 
the outcome of that process. This creates a degree 
of uncertainty that could be exploited by the anti-EU 
camp as the debate unfolds.
 Undoubtedly the EU referendum will be 
a critical moment in the history of UK foreign and 
economic policies; policies that since 1973 have been 
shaped – if not defined – by EU membership. But it 
may also turn out to be a defining moment for the UK 
itself. That is because Nicola Sturgeon, Scotland’s First 
Minister and leader of the governing Scottish National 
Party (SNP), has stated a UK-wide vote for exiting 
the EU (Brexit) could trigger a second referendum 
on Scottish independence if a majority of voters in 
Scotland had voted to remain inside the EU. As matters 
stand this is an outcome that cannot be discounted. 
Opinion polls have, over a number of years, shown a 
majority of Scottish voters support remaining inside 
the EU (66% in a recent Panelbase poll). Opinion 
polls in England, on the other hand, have consistently 
recorded less support for EU membership and, in some 
polls, a majority in favour of Brexit. Opinion within 
Scotland’s (predominantly social democratic) political 
class is more strongly pro-EU membership than among 
the public at large. Indeed the Scottish Government 
opposed holding a referendum on EU membership – 
arguing that although reforms to aspects of EU policies 
are needed, these can (and should) be achieved within 
the EU Treaties (and the UK terms of membership) as 
they stand. 
The principal concern is that by holding a referendum 
the UK Government is needlessly risking Scotland’s EU 
membership while creating a degree of uncertainty 
over the UK’s membership of the EU that will 
damage investment and employment in Scotland 
– much of which is predicated on on-going access 
to the EU single market. Moreover there is a wider 
concern that in seeking to further distance the UK 
from the core objectives of the EU by demanding 
more ‘exceptionalism’ the British government risks 
weakening to an even greater extent than present its 
influence over key EU policies.
 Within the quasi-federal UK system of 
governance competence for many policies that are 
affected by EU legislation have been devolved to 
the governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. And although authority over all EU policy 
matters remains reserved to the UK Government, it 
was agreed that the devolved administrations would 
be permitted to contribute to the formulation of the UK 
negotiating position on EU legislative and policy issues 
that impacted on devolved competences. While it is 
clear that in domestic constitutional terms EU Treaty 
reform is a matter for Member State governments 
to negotiate, because the consequences of Treaty 
reform will impact on the competences of the devolved 
administrations the Scottish Government (and indeed 
Scotland’s fundamental economic and social interests) 
has sought to influence the UK’s EU future in two 
ways. First by proposing the devolved administrations 
are included in the negotiation process and, second, 
by arguing that a decision to leave the UK cannot be 
taken unless Brexit meets a ‘double majority’ test – i.e. 
a majority of across the UK as a whole and a majority 
of voters in each of the four UK constituent parts of 
the UK –  England, Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland. Both proposals have been rejected by the UK 
government.
Andrew SCOTT
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 Although the Scottish Government opposes 
the UK Government’s EU treaty re-negotiation and 
subsequent referendum, and will campaign for 
continued UK membership of the EU in that referendum, 
it does agree reforms to EU governance and policies are 
required if the EU is to regain the confidence of citizens 
and tackle effectively the challenges ahead – not least 
in the areas of climate change and energy security. And 
while welcoming efforts by the European Commission 
to simplify and reduce EU regulations that impact 
disproportionately on small enterprises and hinder 
competitiveness, the Scottish Government seeks more 
progress in ensuring the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality are properly observed in the design 
and implementation of EU legislation. In this respect 
the Scottish Government would be unlikely to oppose 
any re-statement of the need to ensure EU rules do 
not compromise the competitiveness of Scottish firms. 
Similarly completion of the single EU market – another 
issue raised by the British Prime Minister – is regarded 
as desirable though self-evidently does not require any 
change in the UK terms of EU membership to achieve. 
 On other re-negotiation themes raised by 
Prime Minister Cameron the Scottish Government 
has raised serious concerns. In particular the 
Scottish Government – in common with many EU 
Member States – opposes Treaty changes that would 
restrict, directly or indirectly, the free movement of 
persons. It is estimated that Scotland is home to 
approximately 160,000 citizens from other EU Member 
States: citizens who make a significant contribution 
to Scotland’s economy and society. Restricting 
free movement of labour would almost certainly 
have a negative effect on Scotland’s labour market 
with adverse consequences for the long run rate of 
economic growth. Moreover as is the case with many 
other EU Member States, including the UK, Scotland 
faces acute demographic challenges over the medium 
term and free movement of persons is regarded as a 
key mechanism to meet those challenges. At the same 
time the Scottish Government, like other governments 
across the EU, is supportive of measures that ensure 
social security systems are not open to abuse under 
the free movement principle – albeit there is little 
evidence that such abuses are prevalent.  
 Exempting the UK from the Treaty recital 
on “ever closer union” is generally regarded as 
presentational rather than impacting on the substance 
of EU membership, although if agreed it may lead to 
a diminution of British influence in the EU legislative 
and policy processes. This not only raises concerns 
about protecting Scottish interests in general at the EU 
negotiating tables, it also may dissuade international 
companies from investing in Scotland solely because 
the UK Government has suffered a loss of influence over 
EU laws and policies that impact on those companies. 
Regarding the internal market for financial services the 
UK Government is seeking reforms (possibly including 
an ‘emergency brake’ veto) to the qualified majority 
voting (QMV) arrangements to protect non-Euro area 
Member States from being outvoted by the Euro area 
countries that have an in-built majority. On this issue 
there is perhaps greater understanding of the UK 
position than in other elements of the proposed reform 
package, although there is no support for abandoning 
QMV over single market issues affecting financial 
services. 
 As suggested earlier, the Scottish Government 
position on the UK re-negotiation – that it is not required 
and therefore unnecessarily risking Scotland’s future 
within the EU – reflects in large measure the majority 
public opinion across the country. In part at least 
Scottish public opinion on EU membership has been 
shaped by arguments that were rehearsed during the 
Scottish independence referendum campaign. In that 
debate continued EU membership as a “full” Member 
State was presented by the pro-independence lobby 
as one of the significant benefits that would flow from 
independence. And while opponents of independence 
criticized this argument, they did so not on the basis 
that EU membership was undesirable – rather the 
debate revolved around the process by which Scotland 
would transition to independent Member State status. 
Indeed by flagging up the potential costs of being 
excluded from EU membership as a consequence 
of achieving independent statehood – an assertion 
repeatedly made by opponents of independence – the 
Scottish public acquired a fairly good appreciation of 
the negative consequences Brexit could have. This may 
explain in part at least the more positive disposition 
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that Scottish voters have regarding EU membership 
than voters elsewhere in the UK.
 In Scotland the EU membership debate is 
also part of the wider debate surrounding Scotland’s 
constitutional future. In September 2014 the Scottish 
electorate rejected independence by 55% to 45%. 
At that point the issue seemed to be closed for the 
foreseeable future. However the prospect of Brexit 
has reignited the Scottish independence movement. 
First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has made clear that she 
regards a UK-wide vote to leave the EU as a change 
of such significance as possibly to justify a second 
independence referendum. Moreover it is far from 
inconceivable that the EU membership question could 
trigger a significant swing towards independence. 
Many who voted against independence in 2014 cited 
the fear of being excluded from the EU as a reason for 
doing so. Should the UK as a whole to vote for Brexit, 
but a majority in Scotland voted to remain inside the 
EU, it would be no surprise if the governing SNP took 
that as a mandate to seek a second independence 
referendum.
***
 In conclusion there is considerable scepticism 
among the Scottish political classes and public at large 
of the need for – and motivation for – a renegotiation 
in the UK terms of EU membership. Most regard this 
as an initiative driven by the needs of the Conservative 
Party and not the UK as a whole. By launching this 
venture the sense in Scotland is that the Prime Minister 
is needlessly, and perhaps recklessly, risking Scotland’s 
position within the EU. An exit from the EU – under any 
of the prospective non-membership arrangements that 
may be on offer – is widely regarded as damaging to 
Scotland’s economic and social interests. Indeed that 
is the only conclusion that could reasonably be drawn 
from the UK Government’s comprehensive ‘balance 
of competence’ exercise that examined the costs and 
benefits of EU membership. The Scottish Government 
is committed to campaigning for the UK to remain 
inside the EU – a position consistent with the state of 
Scottish public opinion at the present time. Of course 
public opinion may change. Both the refugee crisis that 
is affecting the entire continent and domestic political 
changes have the capacity to shape public opinion on 
the UK’s EU future. However neither issue would seem 
to directly impact on the question of whether or not 
the UK’s terms of EU membership should be revised. 
On that question there is no indication thus far that the 
majority public opinion in Scotland is shifting against 
EU membership.
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GERMANY: COMMON INTERESTS, DIFFERENT 
ANSWERS
 The realistic option that the United Kingdom 
leaves the European Union is a topic that pre-occupied 
decision-makers and observers of European politics 
in Germany constantly since the announcement of a 
referendum on the “Brexit” by Prime Minister Cameron 
in 2013. In many respects, Germany and UK share a 
common set of values and rules, they are, politically 
and economically, so closely linked that the scenario of 
a Brexit for many Germans is difficult to imagine. From 
the problematic beginnings in the early 1960s through 
the accession to EU in 1973 to the current Brexit-
debate – Germany has always supported the British 
membership: “Your comrades on the continent want 
you to stay and you (please) will have to weigh this if 
you talk of solidarity. […] More than often we do have 
our own misgivings about the European Commission. 
[But] We feel that [the Community] provides us with 
the necessary means for cooperation which we do need 
to solve the problems of the present day crisis“1. The 
words chosen by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in his 
speech at the Labour Party conference in November 
1974 some months before the British referendum on the 
question whether to stay in the European Community 
or not somehow refer to the current situation. 
 Germany and the UK share common interests 
regarding European policy, but today, they give 
different answers to the question regarding whether 
the EU helps solve problems or if it is a part of the 
problem. Finally, in most regards Germany still takes 
the EU for the indispensable framework and instrument 
to achieve its national interests and is not willing to 
back a policy tending to reduce European integration 
to the principles of free trade and intergovernmental 
cooperation. In view of the different European crises 
of the last years, the economic and monetary crisis, 
the conflicts in Ukraine and in Syria/Iraq and the 
current refugee crisis, the German answer to all these 
challenges is still, generally speaking, more Europe (in 
the sense of more integration and more community) 
and not less Europe. Certainly, this is a simplified way 
of characterizing Berlin’s European policy. But looking 
for an answer to the question of how far Germany will 
go to prevent a Brexit, it is important to keep this basic 
conviction in mind.
Common interests: Single Market, trade and 
security
 Nevertheless, British and German interests 
and priorities converge on a number of issues. First 
of all, both countries share a common view on the 
challenges of a globalised world. The export-oriented 
German economy with numerous small and medium-
sized companies acting on the global level depends 
on reliable rules following Western standards in the 
international trade system. Even for Germany the 
support of the European Union in the negotiations with 
the other leading economic powers in the world is an 
indispensable instrument for maintaining and imposing 
European standards. There may be some ideological 
differences between UK and Germany regarding basic 
principles of the best economic system imaginable. UK is 
certainly far from approving the German social market 
economy, but there exists however an almost natural 
alliance between both countries in the area of global 
trade. This basic economic partnership is reflected, 
secondly, in the support for the Single Market as one 
of the pillars of European integration. This is, neither 
for Germany nor for the UK, not only a philosophical 
question. In 2014, UK overtook France as the second-
largest economy in the European Union, a fact that 
underlines the increasing economic importance of the 
UK for Germany. And despite the mentioned British-
German differences, the divergences existing between 
Germany, UK and most of the Eastern EU Member 
States on the one hand and the Member States of the 
South on the other is much more important, since they 
concern central conflicts of European policy such as 
structural reforms and budgetary consolidation.
In the field of security and defence policy, Germany 
has achieved a number of important changes over 
the last 20 years. It has participated and is still 
participating actively in a number of military (and civil) 
operations worldwide and has achieved an important 
reform of the Bundeswehr. It has participated in the 
negotiations with Teheran about Iran’s nuclear program 
and assumes a leading role in the ongoing negotiations 
with Russia about the Ukrainian conflict. The speeches 
1. Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik 
der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
1974, Munich 2005, p. 1538.
Martin KOOPMANN
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of the German president Gauck as well as of the 
Foreign minister Steinmeier and the Defence minister 
von der Leyen at the Security conference in Munich in 
2013 underlined that Germany is on its way to playing 
a more active role and to take its responsibilities in 
international security issues. These are important 
changes in Germany’s foreign and security policy, 
but they only make sense, if they are supported and 
accompanied by the two main European partners, 
France and UK, who have the necessary resources and 
capabilities to build up a European defence and security 
policy worthy of the name. British support for a real 
Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European 
Union (CFSP) is vital for Germany. The German military 
reforms and political changes that have been achieved 
or are still under way are the necessary basis for a 
closer cooperation of the UK and Germany. Finally, 
London and Berlin are both well aware that future US-
administrations will be less engaged in Europe and 
that the Europeans themselves are responsible for 
security and stability in Europe and in the European 
neighbourhood. But they also share the conviction 
that there may be situations in the future – and the 
Ukraine crisis is just the best example of that – where 
NATO will be strongly needed as a defence alliance. 
Many political actors in Germany argue that a stronger 
German commitment to foster the development of a 
European defence policy has also to be seen as a way 
to keeping the US engaged in NATO. The conviction 
that NATO still has its place in the European defence 
landscape is common to London and Berlin. So, all in 
all, there are important common interests shared by 
Germany and UK that have to be taken into account 
with regard to the Brexit debate especially next year.
German EMU priority: red line for renegotiations 
with the UK
 Today, basically, a large majority of the 
political, economic and civil-society-actors in Germany 
share the vision of the UK being a full member of 
the EU also in the future. However, there are some 
questions that characterize the political debate in 
Germany about the Brexit-issue. The first concerns the 
difficult problem of how to reconcile two of the major 
objectives of German European policy: deepening the 
integration of the euro area to make it more resilient 
and capable to act in times of crisis and strengthening 
the ties between the euro area and the EU-28. In the 
light of the Brexit-discussion, both objectives seem 
to be almost incompatible. Maintaining the priority of 
deepening the Economic and Monetary Union – after all 
an important point of the coalition agreement of 2013 
between the CDU/CSU and the SPD – would severely 
limit the room for manoeuvre in the negotiations with 
UK. On the other hand, paving the way for the “outs” 
to join the euro area has always been a cornerstone 
of German European policy since the enlargement in 
2004/2007. But the British objective to renegotiate 
its EU-membership is not meant to get the UK closer 
to the euro area – it is meant to loosen the ties of 
integration. Some British ideas to modernize the EU 
such as completing the Single Market or cutting EU red 
tape may well be shared by the German government 
and parts of the opposition (the Greens). Nonetheless, 
the German euro area priority seems to be the highest 
hurdle, or in other words, the red line for a renegotiation 
of the British membership.
 At the same time, Chancellor Merkel and a 
number of other important politicians of all political 
parties share the British criticism of an overly Brussels-
oriented European Union. Germany is no longer just 
the “motor of European integration” in Monnet's sense 
of the term. There has never been a referendum 
in Germany about one of the EU-treaties. But the 
political class is very conscious of the sensitivity that 
characterizes the attitude of a part of the German 
public opinion towards European politics made in 
Brussels, but also towards the other Member States. 
There is a growing perception in German public opinion 
that in times of crisis it is up to the Germans to pull 
Europe’s chestnuts out of the fire and, what is more, 
that Germany is even criticised for doing so. For a part 
of the German public, the euro area and debt crisis and 
the current refugee drama have shown that neither the 
Southern nor the Eastern EU Member States are reliable 
partners sharing the idea of solidarity. Some right wing 
politicians of the CSU or the populist AfD (Alternative 
für Deutschland) already express their sympathy for 
the criticism of the Cameron government of an abuse 
of the principle of free movement by immigrants and 
“layabouts” who want to benefit from the social welfare 
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systems of the big EU Member States such as UK or 
Germany. The president of the CSU, Horst Seehofer, 
taking up with the Hungarian prime minister Victor 
Orbán, seizes every opportunity to blame Chancellor 
Merkel of his own political family for having opened 
the borders to hundreds of thousands of immigrants. 
This seems to bring Germany and UK closer to each 
other regarding Cameron’s demand of cutting the free 
movement of people, paradoxically one of the pillars 
of the Single market that he, in turn, wants to achieve 
in the services sector. But to put it correctly, this is 
still a minority position in Germany, the future of the 
anti-European party AfD being uncertain in the light 
of its recent split and of the fact that its founder has 
left the party. Finally, Germany, founding member of 
the Schengen Area, would not question the “acquis 
communautaire” at such a crucial point.
 To this backdrop, it appears that there may be 
some theoretical starting-points for a British-German 
understanding. But it is also clear that neither the 
political will nor the existing public pressure in Germany 
is strong enough to make Berlin enter into negotiations 
with concrete ideas of far-reaching EU-reforms. 
Besides the fact that London still has not presented 
any concrete demands, the divergence between the 
German and British positions in European policy concern 
central issues of European integration. Therefore, the 
German government has a adopted a more or less 
passive attitude of “wait and see”. The German priority 
is the reform of the euro area, and, secondly, Berlin 
will be more than reluctant to embark on a discussion 
about a new EU treaty. The long, difficult and risky 
procedure of adopting a new treaty would interfere 
with the campaign for the parliamentary elections in 
September 2017. In the past, German political parties, 
apart from AfD, did everything to exclude Europe from 
the campaign issues.
 This outlook does not change if we add the 
attitude of the German economy. Certainly, the German 
industry and the tertiary sector companies underline the 
strong economic link between the UK and the EU. The 
facts are clear and impressive: In 2050, no European 
country will count amongst the nine biggest economies 
worldwide.  It is a truism that the size of the market 
is the decisive criterion for the decision of potential 
investors where to place their investments. But the 
Director General of the German industrial association 
BDI, in a statement of May 2015, addressed first of 
all the British government to do everything it could 
to keep the UK in the European Union – and not the 
German government to think about concessions.2
Preventing disintegration
 What would Germany do to keep the UK in the 
European Union? Chancellor Merkel already indicated 
the basic attitude of the federal government when she 
said in a speech in February 2014 in Westminster that 
Germany will not “pave the way for a fundamental 
reform of the European architecture which will satisfy 
all kinds of alleged or actual British wishes”. Since 
then, this attitude has not fundamentally changed. 
The openness of Germany towards some of the British 
ideas to reform European integration does not mean 
that Berlin shares the basic idea of the Cameron 
administration. Re-balancing power in the institutional 
framework of the EU does not mean for Germany a 
simple renationalization of decision-making processes. 
It means first of all a clear and consequent application 
of the existing principle of subsidiarity. 
 There is a fear in Germany that has become 
stronger over the last months and years, that the 
example of the UK negotiating its membership by 
damaging basic achievements of European integration 
could serve as a model. Other Member States with 
strong anti-European political parties could be tempted 
to follow the British example – the beginning of the 
end of the European integration process. It seems to 
be clear that, after a no-vote of a referendum in the 
UK, Germany will have the choice between two evils: 
accepting the Brexit with all the consequences for 
the future of EU policies and for the cohesion of the 
European Union, or negotiating a future UK-membership 
and make concessions that would unavoidably put into 
question the German tradition of a pro-integration 
power in the sense of the treaties of Rome.
2.  „Brexit führt uns alle in die 
Sackgasse“, BDI press release, 
29 May 2015.
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FRANCE: THE UK SHOULD REMAIN BUT NOT AT 
ALL COSTS
 No one has forgotten that UK’s request to 
join the European Community was the cause of great 
resistance on the part of French President Charles de 
Gaulle in the 1960’s. On two occasions in 1963 and 
1967 De Gaulle used his veto to the UK’s membership, 
deeming above all that London’s “special relationship” 
with Washington meant that the country was not a 
sufficiently independent partner to provide inspiration to 
the continental European project. The situation changed 
with the election in 1969 of Georges Pompidou who 
yielded to the UK’s accession on the grounds of the 
balance of power. German economic successes and the 
launch of the Bonn’s Ostpolitik with the countries of the 
Socialist Bloc were beginning to worry French diplomacy 
in terms of Germany’s rising power. It was said then 
in Paris that the UK’s membership of the European 
Community would be a useful means to balancing this 
rise. 
 Since January 1st 1973, when the UK joined 
the European Community, from Paris’s point of view, 
the reason for good relations with London has always 
been more political than economic. Both countries are 
permanent members of the UN Security Council. They 
are the only ones to have a national defence policy that 
mobilises around 2% of their government spending. 
They have a tradition of military intervention and an 
arms industry. For a long time France mainly saw in 
the UK a pragmatic means to consolidate the European 
defence policy. Negotiations over this have not always 
been easy since London has insisted on recalling the 
priority given to NATO, whose Integrated Military 
Command France quit in 1966, only to re-join in 2009. 
The “Saint Malo Agreements” signed in 1998 by Jacques 
Chirac and Tony Blair did however enable the relaunch of 
the institutionalisation of the European defence policy – 
a commitment that London will find it difficult to adhere 
to in 2015 due to the debate over the Brexit.
Three reasons to keep the UK in
 There is no doubt that the French government 
– at present on the left - but without there being any 
great difference were it on the right – does not want 
the UK to leave the European Union definitively for at 
least three reasons. 
 The first reason is that Paris, as a founding 
member of the European Community, is convinced that 
the EU is a political experiment that would emerge 
seriously damaged by any disintegration. Although 
in principle the treaties provide for the departure 
of a Member State, this in fact would be seen as a 
clear sign of political failure that could feed European 
debate that is already quite morose in France. Any 
French government would indeed fear that official 
disintegration would strengthen the Eurosceptic 
rhetoric of the parties on the far right and far left, and 
also some Socialist Party and Republicans members. In 
2015 there is not one French political party that openly 
campaigns for a total exit by France from the EU, unlike 
UKIP or some of the Conservatives in the UK. The Front 
National advocates France’s exit of the euro area. But 
departure by the UK from the EU might tempt the Front 
National leaders to ramp up their claim to a higher 
level: total exit from the EU on the grounds that the 
British had now done it. 
 The second reason which obliges any French 
government to prevent the UK’s exit from the EU is the 
objective convergence on diplomacy and defence, as 
well as on other issues, such as civilian nuclear matters. 
In terms of defence Paris has perfectly understood that 
Europe’s participation in world security, increasingly 
alongside the Americans, means working with the 
British in ad hoc coalitions. It was with the UK and the 
USA that Paris decided to intervene in Libya in 2011 to 
bring Colonel Gadhafi’s regime to an end. Regarding 
the conflicts in the Middle East and the fight to counter 
terrorism, exchange with the British diplomatic and 
intelligence services under the CFSP are still extremely 
useful resources to Paris. In a European Union in which 
the German partner is vital in many areas, but less 
in terms of defence due to its history, London is an 
asset that should not be dismissed so readily. The same 
applies to the promotion of civilian nuclear energy. 
British policy aiming to build new reactors is deemed 
as a support to French nuclear policy whilst Berlin has 
decided on a total halt to its nuclear power plants by 
2022.
 The third reason is geopolitical, i.e. it involves 
Christian LEQUESNE
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the balance of power within the EU. The economic and 
financial crisis that started in 2008 has increased the 
differential in power between France and Germany. 
In 2015 Paris is suffering politically from not having 
succeeded, in spite of the Valls government’s efforts, 
to implement structural reform as quickly as Germany, 
which for its part has enabled the country to reduce 
its unemployment rate and revive growth. Germany’s 
ability to fulfil the macro-economic convergence 
criteria set by the treaties, whilst France is struggling 
to do so, strengthens the credibility and therefore 
Germany’s political supremacy. As in the 1970’s Paris 
wants London to remain a power that can balance out 
the central role played by Germany in the EU.
The French red lines
 In October 2015 the French position on the 
Brexit has not been clearly set. The situation is however 
complicated due to the fact that Prime Minister Cameron 
has no interest in revealing his hand too quickly vis-à-
vis his partners, since this would lead to Eurosceptics 
of his party demanding too many specific things. So for 
the time being there are discreet discussions between 
Paris and London focusing on the main issues. The 
French government is prepared to make concessions 
designed to rally the British to the “yes” during the 
referendum but certainly not at any cost. In Paris there 
are red lines surrounding any renegotiation that would 
strengthen the specific status the UK holds in the EU. 
The first is that British renegotiation would just be a 
pretext for a further reform of the European treaties. 
French government leaders believe that most of the 
present dysfunction in the EU (notably in the euro area) 
can be improved without meddling with the treaties. 
In Paris there is no desire for a further constitutional 
reform of the Union, because this would entail the 
huge risk of having to organise a referendum for its 
ratification. The negative result of the referendum on 
the European constitutional treaty in 2005 has meant 
that the French political class has adopted a very 
careful attitude to direct democracy. This is particularly 
true for François Hollande. In the French system of the 
5th Republic a president who has to assume a negative 
referendum in fact loses all legitimacy. Moreover, since 
division over Europe is expressed in France within the 
political parties rather than between left and right, 
François Hollande has no interest in risking any further 
division within the Socialist Party over Europe. 
Secondly, France is firmly opposed to the fact that 
the four freedoms of movement – deemed to be 
a foundation of the treaties - being affected by any 
renegotiation with the UK. Sometimes David Cameron 
highlights the need to review the principle of social 
rights for workers from EU countries who have moved 
to the UK. Paris is totally against this, deeming that 
Britons can legitimately counter welfare fraud, but 
without challenging the acquis of European law. 
Although the flows have been less than those from 
Poland the number of French citizens employed in the 
UK is significant. In London they total 300,000, making 
the British capital the 7th city of France.
 Thirdly, Paris supports the British idea of 
greater power being granted to national parliaments 
to monitor the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality in European law. A more systematic 
use of the monitoring mechanisms provided for in the 
Lisbon Treaty (the so-called “yellow card” and “orange 
card” system), which means that Europe’s institutions 
have to review their approach, is considered to be 
totally acceptable. However, Paris rejects the idea of 
national parliaments being able to cancel a Commission 
proposal, as advocated by some in London, since 
this would mean modifying a fundamental acquis of 
European integration: the European Commission’s 
power of initiative.
 Finally, Paris is prepared to consider London’s 
demands that aim to involve non-members of the 
euro area more in the decisions that affect the EU’s 
economic future. France has already shown that it is 
open to the association of non-euro area members 
in the European Financial Stability Mechanism and 
Banking Union. However, Paris would never accept 
non-euro area members (and in particular those like 
the UK, who are voluntarily opting out) being able to 
enjoy a right of veto over Eurogroup decisions. 
French Public Opinion and the Brexit
 The negotiation agenda over the Brexit should 
be clearer to Paris, as it will to all of European partners 
after the European Council of December 2015. Although 
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for the time being there is no final French position on 
the Brexit, there is a general framework defining what 
is acceptable and what is not. French public opinion, 
which has been mobilised by the financial aid plans 
to Greece and the issue of distributing refugees, has 
expressed few precise views on the Brexit. There 
are also very few surveys that enable us to take the 
temperature of French opinion on this issue. A survey 
taken on 2nd June 20151 shows however that 43% 
of the French would support a Brexit, which is a high 
figure. It is however interesting to note that 50.5% 
of those interviewed aged 50-69 say they support the 
Brexit whilst 68% of the 15 to 29 year olds are against 
it. The young French person’s view of the UK as a close, 
attractive labour market undoubtedly explains this 
difference in general perception. But in the end the UK’s 
exit of the EU would be harder for government leaders 
(and also for businessmen) to accept in France than 
the French population which often assimilates the UK 
as being the spoke in the European Union’s wheel. 
1. To access the survey consult 
http://mingle-trend.respondi.
com/fr/brexit-avis-des-francais-
sondages/
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ITALY: LIMITED MARGINS OF NEGOCIATION
 The Italian government and the main Italian 
political parties clearly favour the United Kingdom (UK) 
remaining in the European Union (EU), although no 
official government statement on the issue nor have 
opinion polls  been run to assess the view of Italians 
regarding the possibility of the UK leaving the EU 
(Brexit).The discussion on Brexit is confined to political 
operatives and its content remains quite vague. This is 
due to the instrumental nature of the Italian position 
on the UK role in Europe, but also to the ambiguous 
position of the UK government towards Europe.
 The UK membership for pragmatic reasons
 Italy has never been fond of the UK. Certainly, 
important sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) are Anglophile, but the mainstream mood in 
the Italian Foreign Service and political élite is of 
suspicion towards the UK and its European policy. 
Historical factors help to understand that mood. 
The UK was for long time perceived as a peripheral 
country in the European scenario, even for the 
Romans it represented the faraway northern limes of 
the empire. For better or worse, Italy has traditionally 
intermingled with France and Germany, more than 
with the UK. Indeed, even in the post Second World 
War period, Italian diplomats spoke French or German, 
languages, rather than English, even when the latter 
had already acquired the status of the lingua franca 
of (at least) the Western hemisphere. It took time, 
for the leaders of the main post-war Italian political 
parties (Christian Democrats and Communists), to 
elaborate more informed relations with the UK, and 
for that matter also with the United States (US). To 
be sure there is a grateful attitude towards those 
countries for the role played in freeing Italy from 
the dictatorial regime. Nevertheless for long time 
they were seen as the Anglo-Saxon nations whose 
individualistic and Protestant ethos was unappealing 
to Catholic and collectivist Italy.
 Italy supported the 1973 UK accession to 
the then European Economic Community (EEC), but 
it did that out of instrumental considerations, more 
than for cultural reasons. The entrance of the UK was 
considered an opportunity for delimiting the Franco-
German leadership of the EEC. Italy was crucial for 
smoothing the integration process because of the role 
of ‘honest broker’ it played when tensions between 
France and Germany arose. However, it was never 
recognized as a co-equal partner by the two countries, 
also because of its internal political instability. With 
the arrival of the UK, the assumption was that this 
role would be strengthened. Indeed, Italy and the UK, 
with France and Germany, constitute the four large 
countries of the EU, countries whose interactions 
have conditioned the path and timing of the 
integration process. Certainly, the new generation of 
politicians that has risen to power in Italy, epitomized 
by the current 40-year old Prime Minister Matteo 
Renzi, is much more Anglophile than the previous 
ones. The enthusiastic visit of Matteo Renzi to the 
UK Prime Minister David Cameron in October 2014 
was considered a demonstration of the more positive 
attitude of new Italian political élites towards the UK's 
role in Europe. In that occasion, indeed, the Italian 
Prime Minister stated forcefully his government’s 
opinion that an EU without the UK would be 
inconceivable, adding that Italy would do everything 
it could to prevent a Brexit. However, beyond the 
rhetoric, that visit was a step along the traditional 
road. Italy wants the UK in the EU for instrumental, 
not cultural, reasons. Contrary to the Scandinavian 
or the Eastern European countries, Italy does not 
pride national sovereignty as the UK does. The Italian 
constitution celebrates the principle that national 
sovereignty should be exercised within the constraints 
coming also from international alliances, something 
unthinkable in the UK's unwritten constitution. 
Although Italy has a parliamentary system as the 
UK, its logic of functioning is opposite to the British 
model. Italy continues to have a multiparty system 
and a weak governmental branch, features that are 
an anathema to the British élites. Moreover, Italian 
and British political parties are radically different in 
ideological and organizational terms. The Italian right 
has been traditionally based on a Catholic culture, a 
culture that even survived Berlusconi’s attempt to 
substitute it with a commercial brand. Contrary to 
the British Conservative Party, the Italian Go Italy 
Sergio FABBRINI
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continues to be a member of the European People’s 
Party. At the same time, the Italian left has been 
traditionally based on a Communist tradition, a 
tradition very different from the Fabian one inspiring 
the British Labour Party. Moreover, contrary to the 
British parties, the Italian parties do not have powerful 
parliamentary organizations. Not only the political, 
but also the economic system of the two countries is 
very dissimilar. Italy had an economic system largely 
controlled by the state which only recently started to 
liberalize, under pressure from the EU. The UK, on the 
contrary, has a more open and competitive economic 
system, particularly since the Thatcher revolution in 
the 1980s. In this regard, Italy is closer to France and 
Germany, although each of the three countries offers 
a different rational for the State’s role in the market. 
Thus, it is not history, politics or economics that leads 
Italy to ask the EU to keep the UK on board. Italy fears 
to remain alone, as a large country, in performing 
the mediating and balancing role between France 
and Germany. It seems clear to the Italians that 
France and Germany prefer to lead the EU without 
constraints from other large countries. Although 
the Franco-German axis was called into question by 
the German reunification of October 1990, German 
political élites have continued to stress the point 
that cooperation with France should represent the 
undisputable priority of their country. There is no 
significant space for Italy in that cooperation, unless 
France and Germany collide over crucial integration 
issues (i.e., the governance model of the Euro area). 
Only in that case, Italy would have the possibility to 
play a role. As it happened during the Greek crisis, 
when the Italian government coalesced with the 
French government, in the dramatic meetings of the 
Euro Group and European Council of 12-13 July 2015, 
to oppose the German proposal to allow Greece to 
exit the euro area (Grexit). For the Italians, without 
the UK, the predominance of the German-French 
cooperation in the EU would become unbalanced. This 
preoccupation is motivated by the evolution of the 
euro area, where, in the event of an existential crisis, 
the Franco-German cooperation would be substituted 
by the unilateral leadership of Germany. This outcome 
makes Italian officials unhappy. 
No real support to the UK views
 The uncertainties, if not ambiguities, regarding 
the UK's strategy in dealing with the European dilemma 
has not helped the Italian officials to transform their 
instrumental position into a more organic one. It is not 
yet clear whether the UK's official position is to ask for 
a comprehensive revision of the Lisbon Treaty or for 
the revision of the regulatory order of specific policy 
regimes or finally for a symbolic declaration that the 
UK will be exonerated from pursuing the project of ‘an 
ever closer union’ as declared by the Lisbon Treaty of 
2009 (and, for that matter, by any EU treaties since the 
founding one, the Rome Treaty of 1957). 
 For now, what is heard in Rome are the British 
complaints against the presumed excessive power of 
the ‘Brussels' bureaucracy’. The complaint is considered 
unfair, if not annoying. As the same UK government’s 
review of EU regulatory impact on the country has 
shown, those complaints do not seem justified. Indeed, 
with regard to the single market, those complaints 
concern mainly the free movement of persons, while in 
all the other sectors, one might argue, the UK has been 
quite successful in limiting the regulatory approach 
considered to be prized by the ‘Brussels bureaucracy’. 
Because above all else the UK values the single market, 
it does not seem plausible to ask, as the UK government 
periodically does, the dismantling of supranational 
regulation. To go back to national regulatory systems 
might result in neither effective nor improved 
standards of regulation. Business cannot prosper in 
a context of multiple and differentiated patterns of 
national regulation, nor there is any guarantee that a 
national system of regulation would be less intrusive 
than a European one. Regarding the UK's request to 
limit, in the country’s territory, the fourth freedom of 
the single market (the free movement of persons), it 
seems unlikely that such a request would be acceptable 
to the Italian government and parliament. The four 
freedoms are considered to be the founding pillars of 
the single market (whose institutionalization in the 
Single European Act of 1986 was mainly due to the 
political pressure of the then Thatcher government). As 
such, they are not negotiable.
 Even the UK's complaints against the EU's bid 
to look for a common policy on asylum and political 
25
 FONDATION ROBERT SCHUMAN / 20th OCTOBER 2015
Brexit: What Fair Deal between UK and EU Member States ?
refugees appear highly unjustified in Rome. The UK 
has already has a special arrangement on asylum, 
combining opting-out and opting-back-in. Indeed, the 
UK has an impressive number of opt-outs from the most 
integrative projects as no other EU Member State has 
been allowed to have. For instance, in the core matters 
of internal justice and home affairs, the UK has in 2014 
opted out of 130 EU laws, while opting back in to 35 of 
them, including the salient case of the European Arrest 
Warrant.  Also in the field of civil judicial cooperation, 
the UK has an opt-out, with the possibility to pick and 
choose in accordance with Westminster’s perception 
of what fits with the British legal tradition. This also 
explains the diffused criticism raised against the UK to 
be an ‘awkward partner’. The tough position taken by 
the current government of David Cameron against the 
quota system proposed by the Commission of Jean-
Claude Juncker, for the distribution of Syrian political 
refugees among the EU Member States according 
to some objective criteria, appears inexplicable in a 
country like Italy that had to take care of the arrival 
on its shore of thousands and thousands of them in the 
last three years. The opinion in Rome is that economic 
and political immigration is a hot electoral issue in UK 
as well in Italy, as shown by the spectacular success 
of both the UKIP of Neil Farage and Beppe Grillo's 
Five Stars Movement in the European Parliament (EP) 
elections of May 2014. Although the UK government will 
probably accept to meet the Commission’s proposal on 
a ‘voluntary basis’, the Italian government has stressed 
with force that each EU Member State should bear 
its part of the migratory burden (and the connected 
political risk). Regarding this crucial issue, Italy is 
closer to the German approach to welcome political 
refugees, contrary to the UK that seems to cultivate 
an isolationist approach. Finally, the UK's complaint 
against an excessive EU budget is perceived in Rome 
as unjustifiable. The UK already enjoys a special 
rebate and has successfully imposed, with the German 
support, significant cuts in the 2014-2021 multiannual 
financial framework.
***
 Certainly, Italy shares the view of the 
Commission's President Jean-Claude Juncker, as 
declared in the State of the Union address he delivered 
before the EP on 9 September 2015: “I will seek 
a fair deal for the UK  I will do this for one reason 
and one reason alone: because I believe that the EU 
is better with the UK in it and that the UK is better 
within the EU””. However, seen from Rome, the 
margins for a negotiation between the UK and the EU, 
before the referendum of 2017, seem quite limited. To 
exonerate formally the UK from pursuing the project 
of ‘a closer union’ would require a treaty change that 
is impracticable before 2017. In 2017 there will be 
national elections in both France and Germany and 
neither of the two incumbent governments wants to 
open the Pandora's Box of institutional reform. It is 
however likely that, after those elections, treaty reform 
will re-enter the EU agenda, as proposed by the Five 
Presidents Report of July 2015. Before 2017 what the 
UK can get is a declaration by the European Council on 
its special status in the integration process. Regarding 
the other complaints, their rationale appears to be 
unpersuasive, unless the UK government makes a 
political effort to identify clear red tape issues to put on 
the negotiating table. If those requests are compatible 
with the integration process, then Italy will pressure for 
meeting them. However, if those requests risk watering 
down the integration process, it seems unlikely that 
Italy will pressure to meet them. The Italian national 
interest coincides with the deepening of the integration 
process, more than with the UK participation to it. The 
UK government should be aware that, between the 
deepening of integration and the UK participation in it, 
any Italian government would choose the former and 
not the latter option.
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SPAIN: AVOID A BREXIT
 Despite the changes observed in relation 
to the Euro crisis Spanish public opinion towards EU 
affairs can still be characterised by the permissive 
consensus, so the Spanish Government is not likely 
to be pressured by the public opinion directly. Spain's 
position in relation to the possible negotiation issues 
in regarding the UK's demands and to a broader 
reform of the EU Treaties presents the difficulty that 
so far we have no negotiation agenda considering the 
British government has not presented a list of concrete 
demands. However it is likely to be dominated by an 
interesting paradox:  Spain is likely to make efforts to 
keep the UK in even though Spain and the UK tend to 
vote very differently in the Council and the Spanish 
political elite remains strongly pro-European. How will 
the future Spanish political scenario - general elections 
which will take place on December 20th - affect the 
future negotiations? Although any Spanish government 
is likely to maintain a number of “red lines” tied to 
the general interest, the politicisation of EU affairs is 
however likely to surface in issues relating to requests 
of a more “business friendly” EU.
The renegotiation of EU membership
 Spanish public opinion is unlikely to be a 
deciding factor in explaining the country’s position 
toward the negotiation with the UK. The attitudes of 
the Spanish public toward the EU still present several 
characteristics of the permissive consensus as debates 
on the EU very rarely acquire significant resonance 
and the public has for a long time shown high levels 
of trust in EU institutions and a preference for further 
integration, although these two dimensions are 
changing rapidly in the context of the Euro crisis. 
If we look for specific data it turns out that there are no 
surveys on the Spanish public's opinion on the prospect 
of the UK leaving the EU. However attempts can be 
made to infer the position of the Spanish public from 
specialised surveys and from their opinion towards the 
UK. First of all it appears that Spanish businesspeople 
are among the most concerned in view of a British 
exit from the EU1. As for the general public, research 
on global attitudes and stereotypes suggests that the 
Spanish public have a neutral attitude towards the UK2.
Other than attitudes of the public one needs to consider 
the attitudes of Spanish political parties. Here it is 
even more difficult to rely on precise data, other than 
the qualitative appreciation that political elites have 
traditionally shown strong support for some features 
of the British democracy in light of eventual reforms of 
the Spanish political system3. The current conservative 
government of the Partido Popular (member of the EPP) 
and the socialist main opposition party (PSOE, member 
of the PES) have traditionally maintained an attitude of 
institutional support for the Government to address EU 
institutional negotiations as the sole representative of 
the country’s interest. This does not imply that the type 
of government may not make a difference in Spain’s 
position (see the last section) but the main opposition 
party is unlikely to politicise it. However parties such 
as Izquierda Unida or the more recent Podemos (both 
members of the European Unitary Left group in the EP) 
are likely to frame the British referendum as a sign of 
the need to open up a large, national level debate on 
on EU integration.
 All these elements lead us to expect that 
Spanish public debate would tend to see a British exit 
of the EU as a sign of European disintegration but also 
that this opinion is very unlikely to have a significant 
effect as in these matters the Spanish public still vests 
a high degree of “passive trust” in political elites. 
Spain’s red lines in any negotiation and Treaty 
changes
 It is not simple to anticipate how the 
Spanish government may react to British demands to 
renegotiate their relation with the EU without being 
aware of these. However considering different speeches 
by British government officials4 three main types of 
demands can be expected: symbolic, institutional and 
economic. The most symbolically loaded demands 
are related to a potential British opt-out from the 
“ever closer union” among the peoples of Europe and 
the sovereignty of the British Parliament. That said 
both elements have a potentially significant effect on 
the institutional equilibria as the “ever closer union” 
clause has been used by the ECJ to provide teleological 
 1. Grant Thornton The future 
of Europe. Grant Thornton 
International Business Report 
2015
2. Pew Research Center (2013) 
The New Sick Man of Europe: the 
European Union, Pew Research 
– Global Attitudes Project, 13 
May 2013, online, available 
at: http://www.pewglobal.org/
files/2013/05/Pew-Research-
Center-Global-Attitudes-Project-
European-Union-Report-FINAL-
FOR-PRINT-May-13-2013.pdf
3. For a good summary of this 
debate see Politikon, 2014. La 
urna rota. La crisis política e 
institucional del modelo español. 
Barcelona, Ed. Debate.
4. Euractiv (2015) " Osborne 
spells out Britain's key demands 
on EU reform" 11/06/2015 
Euractiv.com, available online 
at http://www.euractiv.com/
sections/uk-europe/osborne-
spells-out-britains-key-demands-
eu-reform-315302
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interpretations of the Treaty and an increased role for 
the national Parliaments may further slow down policy 
adoption and increase the number of potential veto 
points. Furthermore the UK seems to want to have 
a say in decisions on the Euro that have a potential 
impact on the City of London's financial services. 
Finally in relation to concrete policies the UK seems 
to have decreased its concerns on “fortress Europe” 
and the Common Agricultural Policy to focus most of 
its demands on curtailing free movement of people, or 
more in particular, the principle of non-discrimination 
on the grounds of nationality of EU job seekers in the 
UK. This is accompanied by a general claim to make the 
EU more business friendly. 
 The attitude of the Spanish Government is 
likely to be very negative towards some demands but 
may overall accept significant changes, including some 
that may require a Treaty amendment. Unlike some 
other governments the process of ratification of Treaty 
changes is relatively light for the Spanish executive 
because it is subject only to Parliamentary ratification 
only. Hence the issue is unlikely to boost a significant 
debate in spite of a possible increase in parliamentary 
fragmentation after the next election. The Spanish 
government will be ready to find a compromise to tie 
the UK into the EU. The Spanish Prime Minister Mariano 
Rajoy has recently said that Spain will be “constructive” 
in the renegotiation and that he shares demands by the 
British government in relation with the competitiveness 
of European economies and the need to conclude a free 
trade treaty with the United States5.
 From the perspective of Spain’s interests 
supporting the UK in the EU might seem counterintuitive 
as UK and Spain are among the countries which more 
often than not vote in opposite directions in the Council6. 
However Spanish governments have traditionally seen 
the UK as a natural ally whenever the preferences of 
the Franco-German partners differed from those of 
Spain such as during the Iraq war. Similarly the UK 
is seen as a country generally supporting geopolitical 
choices dear to Spain such as openness to further 
enlargement or the facilitation of contacts with former 
colonial empires. 
 The demand that Spain is more likely to reject 
firmly regards restrictions to the right of free movement. 
Firstly a high number of Spaniards have recently moved 
to the UK as a consequence of the economic crisis since 
2008. Moreover Spain is home to a large number of 
British residents - mostly retired expatriates in touristic 
areas - of which a large proportion is not officially 
registered with the local authorities, with the real 
population possibly multiplying  the officially registered 
280.0007 by two. This is already seen as a pressure 
on the health system as unregistered residents are not 
considered in budgeting and their expenditure is difficult 
to reclaim8, but would make things more complicated 
if the existing EU rules on health assistance no longer 
existed between the UK and Spain. On a more symbolic 
level Spain is unlikely to accept a removal of the “ever 
closer Union” recital but may be ready to compromise 
in the form of a declaration for the UK. 
 On another number of issues the Spanish 
government may be likely to cooperate. Although 
a recent official paper on deepening monetary and 
fiscal integration9 does not address the relation with 
non-euro area member states it considers the need of 
deepening the internal market, which may be part of 
an acceptable deal for the UK. Furthermore the fact 
that the paper explores the need for a political union 
is a sign that the Spanish government may be likely to 
support a reconsideration of the governance of the Euro 
area that would strengthen its political governance in 
exchange of a better clarification of its impact on the 
internal market. Another aspect on which the Spanish 
government is likely to consider its position is the 
question of the national parliaments. Even though 
Spain is unlikely to accept a system empowering 
the UK Parliament only or generally slowing decision 
making it could consider strengthening the ability 
of national Parliaments to intervene in the EU by for 
instance asking the Commission to come forward with 
a proposal.
The position of Spain after the 2015 general 
election
 All analyses of the Spanish position on British 
renegotiation must consider that the next general 
election is probably to be held on 20/12/15. All the 
surveys since 2013 indicate that none of the two large 
parties that have governed Spain since 1982 will be 
able to obtain a sufficient number of votes to hold power 
5. Communiqué of the Spanish 
Government on David Cameron 
visit to Madrid (04/09/2015) 
http://www.lamoncloa.gob.
es/presidente/actividades/
Paginas/2015/040915-
rajoycameron.aspx
6. Van Aken, W. (2012). Voting 
in the Council of the European 
Union. Swedish Institute 
for European Policy Studies 
(SIEPS): p. 52.
7. According to the official 
figures of the Instituto Nacional 
de Estadística (2015) http://
www.ine.es/prensa/np904.pdf
8. Garrigós Simón, Fernando 
J. y Palacios Marqués, Daniel 
(2008) “El turismo residencial y 
las políticas públicas europeas”, 
in Estudios de Progreso, 31
9. Prime Minister's Office of 
Spain (2015) Contribución 
de España al debate sobre 
la Gobernanza de la Unión 
Económica y Monetaria 
available online http://
www.lamoncloa.gob.es/
serviciosdeprensa/notasprensa/
mpr/Paginas/2015/270515-
gobernanza.aspx
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alone, with two new parties emerging to the left of 
the socialists (Podemos) and towards the centre-right 
(Ciudadanos). The majority of polls in early September 
suggest the following percentages of vote in a general 
election: PP (28%), PSOE (25%), Podemos (17%), 
Ciudadanos (12%), Izquierda Unida (4%), with other 
nationalist or regional parties totalling about 14% of 
the vote10.
 The last local and regional election held 
on May 25th 2015 gave some hints about possible 
coalitions. Whereas the Partido Popular have been able 
to form executives with the support of Ciudadanos, 
the Socialists have been able to govern with supports 
by both Ciudadanos and Podemos in different regions. 
So even if they are slightly behind in the surveys, 
the Socialists may be in a better position to try and 
form a government. An alternative – very improbable 
- would be a Popular Government formed thanks to 
the abstention of the Socialists in a context of a 
constitutional and federal reform in order to find a deal 
with Catalonia. 
 In any case there is a certainty that the next 
Parliament will be more fragmented and euro-critical 
voices will be better represented in it. Furthermore 
the crisis of the euro has had an effect in the public 
discourse and programme of the Socialist party which is 
now more demanding of the European Commission and 
cautious about possible effects of European integration 
on the welfare state and labour conditions. The 
consequence is that although public opinion is unlikely 
to mobilise, and the Parliament will probably remain 
strongly proEuropean, a minority popular government 
or a socialist one, indirectly supported by Podemos, 
may need compensations in order to proceed with a 
stronger internal market deregulatory or liberalisation 
agenda. 
10. This is a not a single poll but 
an average of polls published in 
several media, a methodology 
aiming at compensating for the 
different biases introduced in 
different modes. Kiko Llaneras 
(2015) "Así votarían los 
españoles: suben PP y PSOE 
pero el bipartidismo sigue en 
mínimos históricos" El Español 
4/09/15 http://www.elespanol.
com/actualidad/asi-votarian-
los-espanoles-suben-pp-y-psoe-
pero-el-bipartidismo-sigue-en-
minimos-historicos/
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POLAND: STRENGTHEN THE EU AS A WHOLE
 Three issues determine Poland’s position on 
the UK’s renegotiation agenda. 
 First, with almost 700.000 Polish citizens living 
and working in the UK Poland constitutes one of the 
main reservoirs of the immigrant labour force. Most 
importantly, Polish immigrants are one of  the main targets 
of the British claim to limit intra-European immigration, 
cut-down the welfare benefits for immigrants as well 
as of the populist agenda of UKIP (in spite of the fact 
that Poles are substantial net contributors to the British 
budget). 
 Second, United Kingdom is an important ally 
of Poland in many relevant EU policy area ranging from 
security and defence (Transatlantic orientation including 
a full support for TTIP), through EU enlargement 
policy (both countries are supporters of EU principle of 
openness), to championing the free, single market. 
 Third, both Poland and the UK are not members 
of the Euro area and despite their different approaches 
(for Poland accession to Euro area is mandatory and has 
been a declared, whereas distant goal. Both countries 
will share this status for the foreseeable future. 
 This mix of factors results in a paradoxical 
outcome: Poland belongs to those countries which would 
genuinely wish the UK to stay in the EU but which fails to 
understand London’s strategy in renegotiating its terms 
of membership, in particular as long as migration issues 
are at the centre of interest of Cameron’s government 
and British voters. They are likely to overshadow the 
commonalities in other, less relevant areas. Poland’s 
scepticism about the British plans is fuelled also by 
Warsaw’s firm opposition to the idea of a treaty change 
which might be necessary to meet most of the central 
British expectations. 
The red line on the free movement of workers
 Clearly, the migration issue is the largest 
stumbling block from the Polish perspective - a red line 
which must not be crossed, as Polish representatives 
argue. Especially those British demands which are 
related to the access to labour market and social welfare 
have little if not no chance of being accepted by any 
Polish government.  In his November 2014 immigration 
speech, David Cameron argued that the UK government 
intends to require EU citizens to have a job offer before 
they are allowed to be resident in the UK. This is not 
in line with the EU legislation. To be amended it would 
require a treaty change (which Poland rejects), but 
meeting this demand would also mean an acceptance 
of formal discrimination of non-British EU citizens which 
is a no-go for Poland. Also Cameron’s ideas that „those 
who want to claim tax credits and child benefit must 
live here and contribute to our country for a minimum 
of four years“ and that no benefit should be granted 
to immigrant workers for their dependents  that do not 
live in the UK have been firmly opposed by Warsaw. 
Only changes to British domestic law (cutting back of 
benefits) would be acceptable provided that they did 
not lead to any differentiation of treatment of British 
and non-British citizens. Any backtracking on that issue 
would be extremely difficult for any Polish government 
as the subject is highly relevant and sensitive for 
a considerable number of Poles working in the UK or 
benefiting from the migration in different ways. Also, 
limitations of labour migration are considered as an 
impediment to fundamental freedoms within the EU and 
– most notably – to the functioning of the single market 
which is central both to Polish and British approaches to 
European integration. 
 There are, however, two minor points related 
to migration where Poland could possibly show more 
flexibility. Prime Minister Cameron suggested that free 
movement should not “apply to those new members until 
their economies have converged much more closely with 
existing Member States” and that such a clause should 
be part of new accession treaties. As no EU enlargement 
is in sight, this would be a rather declaratory concession 
which Poland might be willing to subscribe to. However, 
the criterion of “economic convergence” is seen as to high 
a hurdle for potential new Member States. The same is 
true, with some restrictions, in terms of the demand for 
tougher rules for criminals and those abusing the free 
movement rules. This could possibly work as an EU-wide 
regulation and not restricted only to the UK. However, 
from the Warsaw perspective a possible new regulation 
should be proportionate and must not be overstretched. 
Most importantly, any criminalization of migrants has to 
be prevented.
Piotr BURAS
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A different euro-out approach
Interestingly, the other big issue in the UK’s 
renegotiation agenda – the relationship between 
the euro-ins and euro-outs – does not provide for 
much common ground between London and Warsaw. 
Despite the similar status (whereas on different 
legal foundations), both countries’ perceptions of 
the fundamental underlying issues differ, as do their 
ideas for the future. In a nutshell, the British stance 
highlighting the risks of euro area integration for the 
common market and the need for a new settlement 
between the common currency area and the rest of 
the EU is perceived as largely unfounded and the 
underlying concerns as exaggerated. Again, the Polish 
general rejection of the idea of a treaty change plays 
an important role, but there are also more reasons for 
the Warsaw's approach. 
 First, Poland is sceptical about a new formal 
settlement between euro-ins and –outs as it would 
formally rubber-stamp its position at the margins of 
the EU which is not seen as favourable (despite the 
reluctance to embark on a clearly defined accession 
strategy). Second, the Polish authorities believe that 
no major treaty reform is possible at least within the 
next five years, an assumption which they claim to be 
validated also by the four presidents' report. Third, 
Poland – as opposed to the UK – does not perceive the 
Euro area as a unified bloc and is thus not so much 
concerned about the possibility of euro-outs being 
regularly outvoted to their detriment by the holders 
of single currency on issues relevant for the single 
market or economic policies. Fourth, the Euro area 
reforms have not led to a major rift between euro-ins 
and euro-outs. According to Warsaw, the principle of 
openness (the right of euro-outs to be at the table) 
has been secured and no separate structures need to 
be created. 
Some initiatives (like the attempts by the Luxemburg 
Presidency to extend the Eurogroup format to other 
Council formations) are criticised by Poland, but no 
major immediate risks are identified. Generally, Poland 
believes that a reform of Euro area is necessary in the 
long run but there is no need to raise the issue now. 
In one particular issue, British and Polish positions 
are remarkably different. For Poland, the question of 
a Euro area budget is particularly controversial (as it 
would possibly limit the resources at the disposal of 
other EU Member States) while the UK is more open 
to this idea as it may reduce the level of its financial 
contributions. Poland promotes the idea of Juncker 
Plan being used also for special Euro area needs as it 
is financed from different sources. 
 The differences between UK and Poland 
with regard to the Euro area-related issues are well 
illustrated by two recent examples. One is related to 
banking union: Poland is considering to join, whilst the 
UK has ruled out such an option. As a consequence the 
positions of both countries collided over the question 
of how to preserve a level playing field for “ins“ and 
“outs“ as far as the financial assistance for countries 
coping with bank resolution and restructuring is 
concerned. In the discussion about the Single 
Resolution Fund UK opposed the idea of enabling 
non-euro area countries joining the Banking Union to 
tap the Balance of Payments Mechanism (anchored 
in the EU budget), in case they needed additional 
financial support for bank restructuring. This situation 
might occur if the resources of the SRF did not 
suffice (the fund will achieve its full operationability 
step by step over the period of 10 years). While 
Euro area countries are eligible for ESM resources 
in an emergency, Poland perceived the access to the 
Balance of Payments Mechanism as the very essence 
of solidarity between euro-ins and euro-outs as it 
would create a level playing field for both group of 
countries. The UK, however, opposed this solution 
(a change of an EU directive was necessary) as it 
feared that the EU budget would become a back-door 
guarantor of the Banking Union, which London wants 
to avoid. Poland and the UK were an on a collision 
course also last summer when the EU Commission 
proposed to use the EFSM (also guaranteed by the 
EU budget) to support Greece – despite the Council’s 
decision of 2011 which stated that euro area countries 
would no longer be given financial aid from this 
mechanism. The UK government strongly opposed 
the Commission’s proposal as a matter of principle, 
while Poland showed more flexibility: it welcomed it as 
it would help to stabilise the situation in Greece and 
thus in the euro area provided that risks for non-euro 
area countries were avoided.
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Other issues are minor
 On the other issues in the British renegotiation
agenda Poland might be more prone to find a 
compromise. They are, however, much less relevant 
for the outcome of the British referendum and thus 
for a possible “yes” campaign on the part of the 
British government. To cut “red tape” is certainly a 
postulate Poland would fully subscribe to. However, 
there is a perception in Warsaw that the Commission 
has already made a substantial progress on that front 
and no dramatic changes in its strategy are required. 
As for the involvement of the national parliaments in 
the EU legislative process, Poland advocates the full 
use of the existing mechanism instead of introducing 
a “red card” procedure which could paralyse, as one 
argues, the EU decision-making.
***
 In sum, Poland is ready to support the UK 
mostly on those issues which would strengthen the 
EU as a whole and not constitute an opt-out for the 
UK. The completion of the single market is the realm 
where Polish and British interests converge most, 
but this is likely to be overshadowed by fundamental 
disagreements on free movement issues. The 
scope for Poland‘s concessions is thus limited. The 
parliamentary election in Poland on 25 October will 
most probably result in a change of government with 
the national-conservative Law and Justice, an ally 
of the British Conservative Party in the European 
Parliament, to form the government after eight years 
of the rule of Civic Platform. Despite the ideological 
proximity, no major shift in the Polish stance on Brexit 
is to be expected. Of course, Law and Justice might 
be more sympathetic to the idea of abandoning the 
“ever closer union“ clause or strengthening the role 
of national parliaments, but these issues are not 
the most relevant fort the UK government. As the 
protection of interests of Polish citizens ranks high in 
the party’s rhetoric, a softening of Law and Justice 
position on the contested migration issues is highly 
unlikely. Thus, from the Polish point of view the future 
of the UK in the EU lies first and foremost in the hands 
of the British Prime Minister. It is related less to the 
outcome of the renegotiation process and much more 
to the question how the UK government will frame 
its referendum campaign despite the slight results 
expected of the renegotiation. 
.
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FINLAND: “WITHOUT THE UK THERE IS NO EU”
 Prime Minister David Cameron’s aspiration 
to renegotiate the terms of the UK membership in 
the European Union, as well as the uncertainty about 
the continuing UK membership has gained some 
importance in the Finnish EU debate in recent years. 
Although the continuing UK membership in the EU is 
seen as a prominent issue for the EU and Finland, the 
UK question has not however become a key feature of 
the Finnish EU debate. The Finnish decision-makers, 
media and other observers as well the general public 
have been first and foremost preoccupied with the 
management and implications of the euro crisis, the 
deterioration of EU’s relations with Russia, and recently 
the heightened refugee crisis. 
UK aspirations in Finland
 The Policy and expert communities in Finland 
have highlighted the continuing importance of an 
active UK engagement in the EU for Finland. The role 
of the UK in shaping the development of the EU’s 
internal market and trade relations with third countries 
are seen crucial in Helsinki to advance the interests of 
a small and thoroughly globalized Finnish economy in 
Europe and beyond. Moreover, the importance of the 
UK for the EU foreign, security and defence policies 
have been equally highlighted in Finland, yet the UK’s 
reservations in developing these policies have been 
noted in Brussels and Helsinki.  At times, a concern 
related to the balance of power among the EU Member 
States can be discerned from general considerations 
on developments in the EU politics. Especially in the 
discussions related to the deepening of the internal 
market and advancing external trade through free 
trade agreements, Finland would lose an important and 
powerful ally within the EU, if Brexit were to take place. 
Moreover, during its 20 years of EU membership, 
Finland has witnessed the UK's overall reluctance in 
taking European integration forward, with methods 
deemed to serve the interests of the smallest Member 
States. Traditionally, Finland has been a supporter of 
strong EU institutions and the so-called Community 
Method. It has, for instance, supported the role of a 
strong European Commission, as it has been seen to 
work for the interest of the smaller members in the EU. 
Relatedly, Finland has accepted transfers of national 
powers to the EU level in the consecutive treaty 
changes in the 1990s and 2000s. It has also supported 
the streamlining of the EU’s external relations and 
developing the Common Security and Defence Policy. 
While the importance of having the UK on board in 
these reforms has been well understood in Finland, 
its hesitance rreflected in its positions vis-à-vis Treaty 
reforms (and also to their implementation), has been 
at times seen to run counter to the Finnish aspirations.
David Cameron’s EU policy, past and present
 The inclusion of the Liberal Democratic 
Party in Prime Minister Cameron’s first government 
was initially seen to highlight continuity in terms of 
constructive engagement with the EU. However, the 
so-called referendum lock vis-à-vis any further transfer 
of powers from London to the EU level (introduced by 
the European Union Act in 2011), the launch of the 
balance of competence review and ordered vigilance 
towards what has been called “competence creep” in 
moving towards joint representation in EU external 
relations, changed this perception. The UK’s EU policy 
has been, at least partly, seen as a further puzzle for 
the EU at times of general uncertainty resulting from 
the failed Constitutional Treaty and the financial and 
economic crisis. 
 David Cameron’s attempt to secure 
safeguards for his country’s financial industry in the 
European Council meeting in 2011, which aimed 
to agree on limited Treaty amendments in order to 
consolidate the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), 
further questioned his European vocation.1 This failed 
attempt, which led him ultimately to employ a veto 
vote, underlined perceptions that his policy is designed 
to serve first and foremost the UK national interest 
and address national audiences. It follows that David 
Cameron’s announcement in 2013 that, if he won the 
2015 general elections, he would strive to renegotiate 
a new settlement with the EU and call for a referendum 
offering the UK electorate a simple choice of staying 
in on new terms or leaving the EU, received a rather 
lukewarm reception in Finland. It was seen to be driven 
1. The UK veto resulted the in 
the so called Fiscal Compact 
intergovernmental treaty (Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and 
Monetary Union) signed by 25 EU 
Member States.
Juha JOKELA
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largely by strengthening Euroscepticism within and 
outside the Conservative Party, rather than a genuine 
attempt to reform the EU for the better. 
 The landslide victory of the openly populist 
and Eurosceptic Finns Party in the 2011 parliamentary 
election, as well as its ranking as the second largest 
party in the parliament after the 2015 parliamentary 
election, adds an interesting element to the Finnish EU 
debate in general and also to the debate on the possible 
UK exit.2 Although the party has gained support by 
criticizing the already tight Finnish immigration policy, 
it is widely agreed that it was the party’s outright 
Eurosceptic posture that led to its historical victory in 
2011. The party’s support increased rapidly during the 
first phases of euro crisis, and during the fierce political 
debate about the unpopular rescue loan programmes 
for Greece, Portugal and Ireland. Because of the party’s 
unconditional “no” to any new loan programmes, it 
was excluded from the ensuing coalition government. 
In the opposition, the party continued to criticize the 
management of the euro crisis, yet somewhat more 
moderate positions started to emerge in the run up to 
the 2015 elections, suggesting the party’s willingness 
to participate in the next government. The shift of focus 
from the euro crisis to the gloomy outlook of Finnish 
economy also geared the campaigns to domestic 
economic and welfare issues.         
 Against this background, it comes as no 
surprise that David Cameron’s announcement in 2013 
to strive for new settlement and call for a referendum 
has received a very warm welcome by the Finns Party. 
Its chairperson Timo Soini – a frequently invited 
speaker to the Conservative Party Conferences – has 
supported Cameron’s EU referendum promise by 
stating that people have the right to express their 
views on EU membership, and if he were Prime Minister 
of Finland, he would arrange just such a popular vote.3 
Moreover, after 2014 European Parliament election, 
his party joined the European Conservatives and 
Reformist (ECR) group in the European Parliament 
alongside the UK Conservative Party. Yet his party’s 
Euroscepticism seem to be rather pragmatic, and 
also able accommodate to political realities in Finland 
and the EU. Public support for the EU and also for the 
euro has remained distinctively high in Finland, even 
during the recent years of euro crisis. Moreover, the 
changing environment of European security and the 
more assertive Russian foreign policy have arguably 
highlighted the EU membership’s importance for 
Finland in terms of stability and security, partly because 
the country is not member of the NATO. 
Cameron’s agenda: What is acceptable for Finland?
 Importantly, the current Finnish government 
EU policy guidelines are of crucial importance for the 
Finnish official position(s) towards the now ongoing 
UK renegotiation process. Importantly, current Finnish 
government is based on a coalition of three major 
parties: pro-European Centre Party and National 
Coalition Party as well as the Eurosceptic Finns Party. 
In his new role as the minister for Foreign Affairs, Timo 
Soini has said to the British press that David Cameron’s 
EU renegotiation and referendum plan is “absolutely 
great idea”, yet UK cannot expect Finland to be a “100 
percent supporter at every stage”.4 He also noted that 
as a government minister his hands are tied to the 
government’s positions in terms of the Brexit question: 
“If there are sensible approaches and suggestions 
tabled then of course we [the Finns Party] can support 
them, but even though we are the second biggest party 
in the government, I can only speak on behalf of the 
whole government up to a certain limit”.5
 One issue concerning David Cameron’s 
agenda in which the current Finnish government 
is rather explicit is the revision of EU Treaties. The 
programme of the current government suggests that 
Finland will not support opening up the EU Treaties. 
The reason for this is twofold. On the one hand, already 
the previous governments were already somewhat 
reluctant to support David Cameron’s aspiration to 
link his renegotiation agenda to the broader issue of 
reforming the EU Treaties. Even if the Treaty changes 
have been seen as a possibility in light of the future 
EMU reforms, Finland has highlighted limited reforms 
and considered a broader process as politically too 
difficult. David Cameron’s aspirations have also served 
as an example on how a process aimed for limited 
institutional changes concerning the EMU, can easily 
spill-over to other policy fields and lead to a major 
Treaty revision process. On the other hand, and as 
the Finns Party has clearly stated, its aim to prevent 
2. The party’s origins are to 
be found from the popularity 
of the Finnish Rural Party 
founded in 1950s, aiming to 
provide a voice for “ordinary 
Finns” – mainly small farmers 
and the working class – as a 
populist protest movement 
running against the old parties 
and ruling elite(s). The political 
and financial bankruptcy of this 
party in mid 1990s was survived 
by the Finns Party, which 
managed to secure one to five 
seats in the Finnish parliament 
until its remarkable victory in 
2011. As a result, it gained 39 
seats out of the 200 seats in the 
parliament.
3. Finnish Broadcasting 
Company, YLE (2013), Soini: 
EU referendum here, too, 23 
January 2013.: http://yle.fi/
uutiset/soini_eu_referendum_
here_too/6464294
4. Telegraph (2015), Finland's 
new foreign minister: Cameron 
EU project 'absolutely a great 
idea', 3 July 2015. Available 
at:   http://www.telegraph.
co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/
finland/11716311/Finlands-
new-foreign-minister-Cameron-
EU-project-absolutely-a-great-
idea.html
5. Ibid.
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potential EU reforms which might lead to a deeper 
integration within the EMU and increase joint liabilities 
among the euro members, the current position of 
the Finnish government also serves their interest as 
new substantial reforms are seen to require a Treaty 
change. 
 As David Cameron now seems to have 
dropped the idea of an immediate EU Treaty reform, 
and is instead seeking legally binding and irreversible 
guarantees that Treaties will be amended according to 
the UK's aspirations, agreement on the agreeing on the 
time frame and form of these guarantees could turn 
out to be a puzzle for Finland. The current government 
might find it rather difficult to sign up for any binding 
agreement envisaging a Treaty reform during its 
expected tenure, which is until 2018. Moreover, 
attempts to give legally binding guarantees and thus 
tie the hands of the future Finnish governments could 
prove to be politically difficult.
 The only clearly stated UK proposal to amend 
the EU Treaties to date is the demand for an opt-
out from the objective to move towards “ever closer 
union”. In substantive terms, the opt-outs already 
secured by the UK from the final stage of the EMU and 
parts of Area of Freedom, Justice and Security policies, 
as well as the UK non-participation in the Schengen 
arrangement have already led to an interpretation that 
this Treaty based objective accepts differentiation and 
underlines flexibility. Therefore pragmatic Finns might 
find it rather easy to accept this proposal in principle. 
However, as the government programme stipulates 
that Finland does not support EU Treaty revisions, the 
above mentioned difficulties in this respect must be 
noted. In addition, David Cameron might have to work 
hard to explain the rationale behind his demand in the 
first place.
 Indeed, several key items on the UK 
renegotiation issues seem to be already high on the 
political agenda of the EU and Finland. Moreover, the 
recent visit of UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, George 
Osborne to Helsinki resulted in distinctively positive 
statements on the UK renegotiation agenda. His 
counterpart in Finland, minister of Finance Alexander 
Stubb noted that the UK's demands for economic 
reforms, restrictions on welfare benefits for migrant 
workers and an enhanced role for national parliaments 
in EU decision-making are justified. In his words, 
the Cameron agenda is seen as “a very constructive 
approach, result-orientated, problem-solving” and “a 
path that will ensure UK membership for the foreseeable 
future”.6
 First, David Cameron wants to make the EU 
more competitive by cutting red tape and liberalizing 
the internal market, for instance. Despite some political 
differences among the EU Member States on how to 
enhance competitiveness, the objective is widely shared 
and forms one of the key objectives of the current 
European Commission and Finnish government. 
 Second, David Cameron wants to increase 
the role of the national parliaments in the EU decision-
making – an objective potentially shared in the Finnish 
parliament in terms of examining the functioning of 
the reforms introduced in the Lisbon Treaty such as 
the “yellow card” procedure. Finland has however 
consistently underlined the need for clarity in terms of 
the two-level parliamentary system (i.e. national and 
European) of the EU. Relatedly, Finland has highlighted 
that its parliament holds a strong and robust position in 
the national EU decision-making, and it has suggested 
that other Member States should first explore ways 
in which they could enhance their parliament’s 
involvement in national EU decision-making.     
 Third, the UK’s aim to limit EU citizens’ access 
to unemployment and in-work benefits, might find 
some support in Finland, yet David Cameron is likely 
to be reminded that the current rules can be amended 
by normal EU law-making procedure. The difficulty with 
this issue is that the freedom of movement, equality and 
non-discrimination are fundamental EU principles and 
highly valued in Finland. Hence proposals suggestive of 
unequal treatment of EU citizens are likely to be much 
more difficult. 
 Finally, the more difficult question of the 
Cameron agenda for Finland could potentially relate 
to the euro area. David Cameron wants to obtain 
“safeguards” against potentially converging interests 
of the euro area countries, as their votes combined in 
the Council of the European Union make a “qualified 
majority” and theoretically enable them to determine 
(with the European Parliament) much of the law-making 
in the EU. The more specific UK concerns regarding this 
issue are related to internal market legislation in general 
6. Financial Times (2015), 
Osborne wins Nordic backing 
for EU reform, 25 August 
2015.: http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/b1d940a0-4a85-
11e5-9b5d-89a026fda5c9.
html#axzz3m6XmayPi
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and financial market regulation affecting the London 
City in particular. Even if the UK's concerns might be 
seen as plausible in Finland, there is currently very 
little evidence of the potential convergence of interests 
in the euro area. Moreover, granting the UK and other 
non-euro EU members substantial “safe guards” could 
potentially result in further complexities in, and hence 
inefficiency of, EU decision-making, which could run 
counter Finnish support for a streamlined system. 
***
 Finland’s Finance minister Alexander Stubb 
has said: “I believe without the UK there is no EU”.7 This 
rather dramatic and blunt statement perfectly captures 
the mood in Helsinki vis-à-vis the Brexit question. The 
implications of Brexit are difficult to anticipate, and 
they could indeed turn out to be rather dramatic for 
the EU given the several ongoing crises with. which 
it is now preoccupied. David Cameron’s renegotiation 
agenda is also seen as a promising starting point for 
an acceptable agreement for Finland. This agenda has 
already been shaped by consultations among the UK 
and other EU Member States. A more detailed look 
on some of the key agenda points however indicates 
certain challenges on the road ahead. Given that an 
EU-wide consensus on the UK question will emerge, it 
is likely to be examined thoroughly, yet constructively 
in Finland.               
7. Financial Times (2015), 
Osborne wins Nordic backing 
for EU reform, 25 August 
2015.: http://www.ft.com/
intl/cms/s/0/b1d940a0-4a85-
11e5-9b5d-89a026fda5c9.
html#axzz3m6XmayPi
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5. BREXIT: A “FAIR DEAL” BETWEEN LONDON 
AND ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS?
 With victory going to the Conservatives and 
David Cameron in the most recent general elections 
in the UK the organisation of a referendum promised 
by the British Prime Minister in his Bloomberg speech 
of January 2013 on the UK remaining or exiting the 
European Union is no longer a hypothesis, but a 
certainty1. We already know the question that will 
be asked to the British population: “Should the UK 
remain a member of the European Union or leave the 
European Union?” The result of the referendum is of 
course extremely hard to forecast today. The domestic 
political situation as well as the migratory crisis will 
have a major impact on the outcome: indeed the inflow 
of refugees in Europe might provide the Europhobes 
with arguments if no solution is found to the current 
crisis, in a context where confusion is maintained in 
the UK by Brexit supporters between free internal 
circulation, external immigration and Europe. Another 
interrogation is the referendum date which varies 
between autumn 2016 and spring 2017. It will also 
depend on the negotiations which take place between 
London and its European partners. 
 However although the power struggle between 
David Cameron and the Europhobes in his party appears 
to be vehement in the UK, he should also assess what 
other national governments are prepared to accept and 
adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards his European 
partners. Not only is this situation uncomfortable for 
the British Prime Minister from a domestic point of 
view but it also causes problems on the external level. 
On the one hand Mr Cameron could lose face and his 
referendum if he achieves too little in the renegotiation 
of the conditions governing the UK’s EU membership. 
But on the other hand the “demands” (a term rejected 
by London) made by the British government could be 
too much to be deemed acceptable by his European 
partners. When in December 2011 Mr Cameron asked 
for the exemption of the British financial services from 
the common rules in exchange for his country’s support 
for the Budgetary Pact his European partners saw this 
as simple blackmail and chose to ignore it. Moreover 
in 2014 London’s isolation became even clearer 
when Berlin finally supported Jean-Claude Juncker 
for the appointment of the President of the European 
Commission, then as they accepted the appointment of 
Donald Tusk as President of the European Council.
What does the British government want? Is the reform 
sought after by London acceptable? What are its 
demands? How far are its partners prepared to go to 
keep the UK in the EU? Is a compromise possible and 
acceptable by all of those involved? If so what might 
the main approaches of this be?
An acceptable reform of the EU?
 We know the main lines of EU reform targeted 
by London, even though some are still relatively vague2. 
 • On an economic level: importance is given 
to the general goal of deepening the single market, 
structural reform, competitiveness, free trade. It is 
clear that this agenda converges with the economic 
preferences of most Member States, notably Germany; 
this will not prevent other States, for example France, 
from considering that liberal reforms cannot form the 
core of the European reform agenda, without return 
gestures for example, in terms of fiscal and social 
convergence.
 • On a political level, there is a will to 
strengthen the control over decisions taken at European 
level by national bodies, notably by an increased role 
for national parliaments in controlling the subsidiarity 
principle3; this mainly aims to strengthen the “early 
warning mechanism” introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, 
which was already strongly influenced by the UK4 and 
used only twice since 20105. This measure might be 
improved in practice. 
 However although the democratisation of 
the functioning of the European Union partially lies in 
the strengthening of control over European decisions 
by national parliaments, the added value that can 
be provided by the latter does not lie as much in 
the “limitative” or “negative” control over European 
legislation as in a constructive and positive approach to 
European issues, as illustrated by the Conventions for 
example. This would be a path to explore further and 
which would help avoid “veto democracy” or blockage. 
1. I would like to thank Jean-
François Jamet for his reading 
of the first draft of this text 
and for his much appreciated 
comments.
2. See the article by the 
British Foreign Minister Philip 
Hammond, Le Figaro, 10 June 
2015; and also the interview 
given to the Figaro by George 
Osborne, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, 29th July 2015.
3. Articles 5 and 12 of the 
Treaty on European Union 
and Protocol n°1 on national 
parliaments and n°2 on the 
application of the principles of 
proportionality and subsidiarity.
4. The rules that are currently in 
force are the following: 
-  beyond one third or a quarter 
of negative opinions depending 
on the area in question, the 
Commission must reassess its 
proposal but it is free to confirm 
it: this is the “orange card”;
- moreover beyond half and 
if the Commission decides to 
maintain its text, the European 
legislator i.e. the Council and 
the Parliament are referred to 
and must decide: this is the 
“red card”.
5. The first case in 2012 
involved the Commission’s 
legislative proposal, « Monti 
II » - European Commission, 
on the exercise of the right to 
take collective action within 
the context of the freedom 
of establishment and the 
freedom to provide services, 
COM(2012)130 final, 21st 
March 2012 ; the second case 
in 2013 involved the creation of 
a European Prosecutors office, 
on the establishment of the 
European Public Prosecutor's 
Office, COM(2013)534 final, 
17th July 2013.
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The “Green Card” mechanism is an interesting possibility 
since it would enable a certain number (to be defined) 
of national parliaments to ask the European Commission 
to take the initiative; for example the UK might use this 
tool to launch a more ambitious project to liberalise 
services and France might use it to launch a corporate 
tax convergence process and/or to define minimal social 
standards, possibly as part of differentiated integration 
(enhanced cooperation for example).  
 The economic and social crisis in Europe has 
especially brought to light the shortcomings in the 
political organisation of the European Union which 
has been unable to keep pace with the increasing 
interdependence of European economies and which has 
failed to create the institutional and political conditions 
for true European democratic legitimacy. However the 
political fragmentation of the European Union has a 
negative impact: not only has it increased economic 
divergence between the Member States; moreover it is 
fostering political tension between Member States and 
between the populations of the Union. The democratic 
legitimacy crisis will not be settled in the long term without 
remedying this contradiction; simply strengthening the 
power of control of national institutions over European 
decisions will not be enough to overcome it6. This is 
the issue at stake in the present debate over “Political 
Union”7.
 In addition, London wants to be exempted 
from the historic goal of an “ever closer Union”, thereby 
supposing a revision of the European treaties (notably 
the Preamble and the Charter of Fundamental Rights). 
In fact the UK already benefits from a certain number 
of opt-outs – notably regarding Schengen and the single 
currency – which shows that this goal is governed by 
“variable geometry” and has not prevented the existence 
of a “several-tiered Europe” as well as differentiated 
integration. The European Council noted in its conclusions 
in June 2014 that the “the UK has expressed its concerns 
about the future development of the EU, which must 
find response. In this context the European Council has 
noted that the idea of ever closer union has enabled the 
different countries to adopt different paths of integration, 
allowing those that wish to move ahead and deepen 
integration to do so, whilst respecting the wish of those 
which do not want to continue deepening.” 
 • Regarding relations between euro area and EU 
the British government is aiming to protect the interests 
of non-euro area countries by achieving guarantees that 
the EMU countries will not impose measures deemed 
contrary to the interests on the others. In a context 
in which the issue of continuing euro area integration 
is on the agenda once more8, that of protecting the 
rights of non-euro area countries is also being raised. 
EMU Member States as well as the “pre-in” members 
(EU Member States that want to adopt the euro) might 
specify their legal obligations in view of fair treatment 
between the States which are euro area countries and 
those which are not9: respect for the community acquis; 
respect for the precedence principle of the EU treaties 
and European law; guarantee of the transparency of 
their activities; right to take part in euro area meetings 
for those who would like to join10. 
 However, clear limits have to be set regarding 
this claim. It is clear for example that recent – 
sometimes surrealist – proposals that aim to do away 
with the legal obligation of the adoption of the single 
currency and even the introduction of new voting rights 
for the non-euro area countries11 are unacceptable: “if 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer really did demand a 
double majority in the single market, that would going 
a bit far (…)12. It is perfectly normal for the British 
government to ask to be treated fairly but should the 
refusal to participate in the euro area open the way for 
the right to have special treatment permanently when 
counting votes? It would be both dangerous, given the 
implied dangers in terms of efficiency and democratic 
legitimacy; moreover “if we grant the UK the right 
to veto or even a special weighting in issues relating 
to finance why wouldn’t Germany be able to ask the 
same for the car industry or France for agriculture?”13. 
We should remember here that 26 Member States 
committed to adopting the single currency when they 
fulfil the required conditions in virtue of article 3.4 of 
the treaty – only two States, Denmark and the UK have 
an opt-out – but these are two exceptions and not the 
rule. 
 • Last but not least, the British government 
would like to obtain measures that limit the benefits 
granted to intra-European migrants notably those from 
Central and Eastern Europe which implies a challenge 
6. Thierry Chopin, 
« Renationalisation vs. 
Europeanisation of Democratic 
Legitimacy”, Policy Network, 
London, October 2013.
7. Sylvie Goulard, Mario Monti, De 
la démocratie en Europe : voir plus 
loin, Paris, Flammarion, 2012.
8. During the European Council of 
June 2015 Jean-Claude Juncker, 
President of the European 
Commission presented a report, 
« Completing European Economic 
and Monetary Union » prepared 
in close collaboration with the 
Presidents of the European Council, 
the Eurogroup, the European 
Central Bank and the European 
Parliament. For a recent Franco-
German article on the issue see 
Emmanuel Macron and Sigmar 
Gabrie’s column, « Europe : 
pour une Union solidaire et 
différenciée », Le Figaro, 3 June 
2015.
9. See George Osborne and 
Wolfgang Schäuble, « Protect 
Britain’s Interests in a Two-Speed 
Europe », Financial Times, 27 
March 2014.
10. Jean-Claude Piris, « Should 
the UK withdraw from the EU. 
Legal aspect and effects of possible 
options », European Issue n°355, 
Robert Schuman Foundation, May 
2015.
11. “Safeguarding non-Euro states’ 
rights is key to new EU settlement”, 
Open Europe, 10th September 
2015.
12. Of course the text modifying 
the regulation establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority 
provides for the existence of a 
double majority – the members 
and non-Members of the banking 
Union but this only affects the 
regulation’s technical standards, 
the standards of implementation, 
guidelines and recommendations. 
Cf. (EU) regulation n°1022/2013 
of the European Parliament and 
the Council dated 22nd October 
2013 modifying the regulation 
(EU) n°1093/2010 establishing a 
European Supervisory Authority 
(European Banking Authority).
13. Sylvie Goulard, “L’Europe 
au miroir de l’Angleterre”, in 
Commentaire, n°151, autumn 
2015, p. 520.
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to the principle of free movement within the EU14. 
 The most serious studies show that free 
movement has a limited impact on national social 
security systems and that the collective benefits are 
higher than the costs, since in reality “workers from 
other Member States are net contributors to the public 
finances of the host country.15”
 Moreover regarding social security benefits, 
the Member States have set rules applicable to their 
own situation and their own legislation16; and the Court 
of Justice recently recalled in the Elisabeta Dano, Florin 
Dano vs Jobcenter Leipzig case that Member States 
retain the power to restrict access to social benefits, 
notably regarding migrants who are not in paid 
employment17. 
 Finally, although we cannot pretend that 
benefit abuse does not exist or not try to counter or 
prevent it – for example by reviewing the posting of 
workers directive – there is a consensus within the EU 
which States that the acknowledgement of a certain 
amount of abuse does not mean that we have to 
challenge the principle of free movement18, which is 
a foundation of European integration. This principle is 
mainly seen by European citizens as one of its greatest 
achievements19. 
 From this point of view it does not seem 
possible for London to achieve its goals in terms of 
what is deemed as a ”red line” by many European 
governments, notably by Berlin and Warsaw. It seems 
that David Cameron is aware of this20. However, if 
heads of State and government succeeded in defining 
a credible joint strategy to counter illegal immigration 
and at the same time responding to the confusion 
spread by Conservative Europhobes between internal 
freedom of movement, external immigration and 
Europe this might help to counter the anti-immigration 
and anti-European discourse of the supporters of 
Brexit.
Deepening the “single market/integration of the 
euro area”: A “fair deal”?
 A compromise that would enable an agreement 
between London and its European partners – notably with 
those who are euro area members or who want to join – 
might lie in combining a programme to deepen the single 
market, notably from a financial point of view, with the 
project for the Capital Markets Union – digital, energy, 
and even defence, on the one hand, and an integration 
project at euro area level on the other, according to a 
general logic that is still a coherent articulation between 
the two main levels of integration: the single market and 
the EMU. The deepening of the single market should go 
hand in hand with guarantees in return which are the 
necessary conditions for fair and healthy competition 
that falls in line with the foundations of the EU: first, the 
respect of the mutual recognition principle; second, the 
respect of the common rules in the single market. As 
an example, it’s possible to accept, to a certain degree, 
tax competition, but on condition that it respects the 
principles and rules applied to competition in all other 
areas: transparency, loyalty, fairness. With this in view 
the project for the deepening of the single market must 
not lead to an uncooperative policy of the “lowest bidder” 
and alignment with the lowest denominator. 
 Moreover this compromise should include an EU 
democratisation programme that would enable response 
to the democratic issue as diagnosed in London and 
revealed by the Greek crisis21. Democratisation means 
strengthening the role of the national parliaments 
–  hich must not just be restricted to a negative role of 
censorship, but which might be constructive, and also 
via the strengthening of the legitimacy of the European 
institutions22.
 This compromise has several advantages. It 
would allow the UK to promote its agenda and to exert 
influence within a deepened single market. For their 
part the UK’s privileged partners (Finland, Ireland, 
Netherlands, etc.) would also be interested in the 
prospect of reviving the liberalisation process within the 
single market23. This would also be the case for Germany, 
which needs it to sell its surplus exports even though 
Berlin remains critical about the liberalisation of services. 
Moreover the Economic and Monetary Union should be 
reformed and deepened, there should be greater euro 
area integration24 with financial solidarity, true banking 
union, the definition of a convergence strategy – notably 
from the fiscal and social points of view – all of which 
based on greater democratic legitimacy – notably 
with stronger involvement on the part of the national 
parliaments and the European Parliament – whose 
prerogatives would be strengthened – in economic and 
14. See David Cameron, “Free 
movement within Europe needs 
to be less free”, Financial Times, 
26th November 2013. 
15. See the European 
Commission’s report, “Access 
of mobile EU citizens to Social 
Protection”, Research note n°.10 
/ 2013.
16. Philippe Delivet, “Free 
movement in the EU: Principle, 
Stakes and Challenges”, European 
Issue, n°312, Robert Schuman 
Foundation, May 2014.
17. Decision C-333/13, 11th 
November 2014
18. Internal Justice Affairs Council 
of 5th December 2013.
19. 57% of Europeans quote 
freedom of movement as the 
most positive result achieved by 
the EU ahead of peace between 
the Member States (55%), in the 
survey Eurobarometer, Standard 
83, TNS Opinion & Social, July 
2015. 
20. Alberto Nardelli and Nicholas 
Watt, “David Cameron plans EU 
campaign focusing on “risky” 
impact of EU exit”, The Guardian, 
26th June 2015.
21. See the interview given to Le 
Monde by Benoît Coeuré, member 
of the board of the European 
Central Bank, 27th July 215 
and the speech he gave at the 
Ambassadors Conference in Paris 
on 27th August 2015, “Drawing 
lessons from the crisis for the 
future of the euro area”
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/
key/date/2015/html/sp150827.
en.html
22. For more details, T. Chopin, 
J.-F. Jamet and F.-X. Priollaud, 
« Réformer le processus 
décisionnel européen: légitimité, 
efficacité, lisibilité », Revue 
politique et parlementaire, July-
August 2013.
23. « Britain in the EU 
Renegotiation Scorecard », 
European Council on Foreign 
Relations, 10 September 2015 
- http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/
RenegotiationScorecard-Final.pdf
24. « Completing European 
Economic and Monetary Union », 
op. cit.
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budgetary supervision. David Cameron himself also 
called for EMU to be deepened like this, which is also in 
the interest of the British economy25. 
This compromise might be expressed in two protocols: 
A protocol on subsidiarity and fair treatment within the 
single market which would aim to:
 • Restate the revival of a programme to 
deepen the single market for growth and employment 
and set out in detail the guarantees which comprise 
the vital conditions for healthy, loyal competition which 
form the EU’s foundations, notably the respect of the 
principle of reciprocity and mutual acknowledgement as 
well as the respect of common rules on whose basis the 
single market is run: transparency, loyalty, fairness;
 • Acknowledge the differentiated integration 
principle as a path to achieve the goal of “ever closer 
union” and on this occasion restate the opt-out the UK 
enjoys whilst respecting its national sovereignty just as 
that of the other Member States; 
 • Specify the changes that aim to improve the 
role played by national parliaments in terms of control 
over the subsidiarity principle;
 • Specify the legal guarantees of the EMU 
Member States (see above) as well as the “pre-in” (EU 
Member States which want to adopt the euro) with 
the aim of protecting the rights of the non-euro area 
member and at the same time reassert the obligatory 
nature of adopting the single currency as planned by 
the treaties, as well as the impossibility of acquiring 
new voting rights by States that are non-euro area 
members.
A protocol on EMU that would aim to:
 • Specify the main points of EMU reform 
which would aim to: consolidate the intergovernmental 
treaties created outside of the community framework 
(Fiscal Compact, European Stability Mechanism – 
ESM – treaty); specify the legal basis for the Single 
Resolution Mechanism of the Banking Union and the 
direct recapitalisation of the banks by the ESM; 
 • Also specify the functioning of the European 
institutions in the euro format (euro area committee 
within the European Parliament, the creation of a euro 
area Ministry of Finance combining the role of President 
of the Eurogroup and the Commissioner for the euro, 
the euro area institutions’ accountability – including 
the Troika, the Finance Minister and the ESM – to this 
committee);
 • Adopt a procedure for the limited revision 
of the European Treaties by the EMU Member States, 
thereby facilitating the adoption of additional measures 
specific to the EMU if they are compatible with EU 
rules. The States that are not members of the euro 
area would be free to join but not to oppose it. The 
additional measures would be included in the EMU 
protocol annexed to the TFEU (cf. above). The change 
of this protocol (therefore the addition of new measures 
specific to the euro area) would only require ratification 
by euro area countries (and in the Member States that 
decide to adopt the euro area’s acquis);
 • Integrate modifications that aim to 
strengthen the EU’s democratic legitimacy not only 
via the enhancement of the role played by national 
parliaments but also by the democratisation of the 
functioning of the European institutions.
 Initially these two protocols might take the 
form of a political declaration by the Heads of State and 
government, a declaration that might be made formal 
in a second phase on the occasion of the next change 
of treaty. 
***
 David Cameron promised the anti-Europeans 
in his party a referendum, but he wants to stay in the 
European Union. He simply wants to achieve a certain 
number of reforms. He is going to find it difficult to 
maintain a balance between what is being demanded of 
him in Parliament and what his European partners are 
prepared to grant him. It is impossible to say now what 
the outcome of the negotiations and the referendum 
will bring. The domestic situation, as well as that in 
25. 40% of the UK’s exports 
target the euro area.
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Europe, (Greek crisis, refugee crisis etc.) will have a 
major influence over the outcome of the process. It 
is therefore vital for the EU to overcome the present 
crisis both from an internal point of view with the 
EMU crisis and from an external point of view with 
the refugee crisis. The “no” would precipitate the UK 
into the unknown. Although “Brexit” is not necessarily 
likely, its possibility must be planned for and we have 
to think of the various scenarios that might result. This 
is the necessary condition to overcome the uncertainty 
weighing over the result.
 On the one hand the possible outline of the 
compromise put forward in this text might promote 
a positive vote during the referendum and a positive 
outcome, with the UK remaining in the EU combined 
with a strengthening of the euro area. On the other 
if the “no” were to win, the way the “two Europes” 
(the euro area and the single market), work together 
would have to be reconsidered. Although the options of 
the European Economic Area and the Swiss model are 
not feasible for the UK as matters stand, it might be 
possible to revise the rules of the European Economic 
Area (EEA) in order to grant equal voting rights to EEA 
Member States which are not members of the EU in 
terms of the policies in which they take part, notably 
those involving the single market26. This would provide 
a response to a certain number of issues and enable 
the deepening of the euro area as well as a realignment 
of two major levels of integration: participation in the 
single market and participation in the Economic and 
Monetary Union.
26. Thierry Chopin and Jean-
François Jamet, “David Cameron’s 
European Dilemma”, Project 
Syndicate, 18 January 2013; 
and also Thierry Chopin “Two 
Europes”, in Europe in search of a 
new Settlement. EU-UK Relations 
and the Politics of Integration, 
Policy Network, London, 2013.
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